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ABSTRACT 
 
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: 
A CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS 
 
BY 
 
MING-HUNG YAO 
AUGUST 2007 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 This dissertation seeks to investigate the relationship between public sector 
employment and fiscal decentralization. We develop a theoretical model that helps us 
understand the interaction of the central executive’s and subnational governor’s decisions 
on the level of public employees at the central and subnational levels. Our empirical work 
shows that fiscal decentralization policy shifts central government employees to the 
subnational government level and that the increase in public employees at the subnational 
government level overwhelms the decrease in public employees at the central level. As a 
result, the level of total public sector employees increases with the degree of fiscal 
decentralization of a country. We also find that the levels of total public sector employees 
as a percentage of population are higher in unitary country systems than those in federal 
xiii  
countries.  The level of public employment also increases with the degree of urbanization 
and with the exposure to risk of a country. 
 This is somewhat a surprising result. Typically, more public employment is 
associated with an excessive number of public sector employees, and, therefore, with 
unproductive spending. On the other hand, fiscal decentralization policy has been 
generally thought to result in an increase in allocative efficiency, since a decision on 
public expenditures made by a level of government that is closer and more responsive to 
a local constituency is more likely to reflect the demand for local services than a decision 
made by a remote central government. In addition, decentralization has been thought as 
having the potential of improving competition among governments and of facilitating 
technical innovations. Therefore, one might expect that fiscal decentralization should 
help to retrench the public sector employment. However, from our empirical result, we 
find that subnational governors without taking full responsibility for subnational public 
finance tends to bloat the levels of subnational government employees and ask the central 
government to pay the bill. As a result, the level of total public sector employees 
increases with fiscal decentralization policy. These findings are much in line with Oates’ 
and Wallis’ anticipated results, but they are based on different explanations. 
 Employing the two most commonly used spatial dependency tests, Moran’s I and 
Getis and Ord’s G statistics, we also find evidence of spatial dependency in terms of the 
level of public sector employees as a percentage of population among the countries in our 
dataset. This finding suggests that while using country’s own domestic variables to 
explain the level of public sector employment, we should not ignore that the neighboring 
countries’ policies also play an important role in determining it.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
There is little doubt that the government activities play an important role in the 
modern economy. Government influences the economy via several instruments, such as 
fiscal policies and monetary policies. Public sector employment, which accounts for a 
considerable share of total employment in many economies, is an important tool of fiscal 
policy and has attracted a great deal of attention over the past two decades (Gregory & 
Borland, 1999). Today bloated bureaucracies and over-staffed public enterprises are very 
common problems in developing countries, especially in transition economies, where the 
shift from plan to market requires millions of workers to be relocated. An excessive 
number of ministries, duplications of functions, or the existence of ghost workers has 
been identified as major instances of unproductive spending (Rama, 1997). Consequently, 
retrenchment of public sector employment is becoming an important issue of economic 
reform in these countries. 
Decentralization, defined as the transfer of authority and responsibility for public 
functions from the central government to subordinate or autonomous government 
(subnational government hereafter) organizations or the private sector, has been a 
worldwide trend in the last two decades (Rondinelli, 1999).1 An economic argument for 
decentralization is that it increases allocative efficiency. First, a decision about public 
expenditures that is made by a level of government that is closer and more responsive to a 
local constituency is more likely to reflect the demand for local services than the one that 
is made by a remote central government. Second, decentralization leads to competition 
among governments and enhances innovations (Ford, 1999). Due to these two arguments
                                                 
1 For more detail of the definition of decentralization, please refer to Chapter Four. 
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for decentralization, one might suggest that fiscal decentralization may be a remedy for 
bloated bureaucracies and over-staffed public enterprise in developing countries. In this 
dissertation we try to answer whether the fiscal decentralization policy would help to 
retrench the public sector employment. 
In Appendix A, we show the cross-county public sector employment data as a 
percentage of population from 1985 to 2005 for Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD hereafter) and non-OECD countries.2 From those data, we can 
observe several trends. First, while public sector employment has grown in some 
countries, it has shrunk in the others for the period 1985-2005. We can call this the time 
series variation of public employment. Second, the size of public sector employment in 
some countries is larger than that in other countries in any year. We can call this the 
cross-sectional variation of public employment. This dissertation seeks to explain these 
variations over time and across countries in public sector employment. Besides gaining 
an understanding of the sources of public employment variation over time and across 
countries, we are also interested in examining the process of public employment 
decentralization in some countries around the world and the degree of public employment 
decentralization in some countries growing faster than the others. We can call this the 
structural dimension variation in public employment. Appendix B shows the public 
employment as a percentage of population at the central and subnational government 
                                                 
2 These data are from the International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset, published by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) bureau of statistics. The website is http://laborsta.ilo.org/, accessed 
June 11, 2007. The data are available since 1985. Before 1996, the data are available every five years. Since 
then the data are available every year. The latest year data available are 2004. In order to compare the data 
after 1995 to those before 1996, we calculate the five year average for the year 2000 and 2005. That is, the 
observations of year 2000 and 2005 are the unweighted average from year 1996 to 2000 and from 2001 to 
2004 respectively. The list of OECD member countries can be found at OECD web page at:  
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed June 11, 
2007. 
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levels for OECD and selected non-OECD countries in 1995 and 2000.3 
Three hypotheses have been used to explain these variations in public 
employment. The first is a conventional economic explanation and it is known as 
Wagner’s law. This “law” argues that economic development creates demand for new 
types of government services (Kraay & van Rijckeghem, 1995; Rama, 1997; Schiavo-
Campo et al., 1997a, 1997b; Tait & Heller, 1984). The second is a political-economy 
explanation which views public employment as a means by which politicians conceal 
redistribution in favor of specific groups (Alesina et al., 2000; Alesina et al., 2001; Gelb 
et al., 1991; Gimpelson & Treisman, 2002; Robinson & Verdier, 2002). The third is an 
international economic explanation, according to which public employment is linked with 
the exposure to foreign trade of a country (Rama, 1997; Rodrik, 1996, 1997). 
Although all these three hypotheses may seem to explain part of the variation in 
public employment, they do not seem to account for all the relevant facts. If Wagner’s 
law is correct, one would expect richer countries or richer subnational regions to have 
higher level of public employees. However, for example, in Italy we find that the poorer 
regions have higher level of public employees than the richer regions (Alesina et al., 
2001). If public employment is a tool for politicians to transfer benefits to specific groups, 
one should expect countries or subnational regions with the same population to have the 
same amount of such patronage flows. Is this the case? In reality, such benefits correlate 
with the degree of ethnic division or income inequality but not the amount of population 
(Alesina et al., 2000). Finally, if setting up a higher level of public employees is an 
                                                 
3 This data are from the World Bank Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset, which is published by the 
World Bank. The website is http://sima-ext.worldbank.org/publicsector/, accessed June 11, 2007. In this 
dissertation the terminology of subnational government is referring to the summation of state (or province 
in some countries) and local governments.   
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instrument for officials to conciliate the impact of trade-related dislocation, why do they 
choose such as an inefficient tool (Robinson & Verdier, 2002)? Retraining or transfer 
schemes would be far more cost-effective policy, whether the politicians’ goal is to insure 
vulnerable workers or to buy votes (Gimpelson & Treisman, 2002). 
While these three hypotheses might work well in explaining some facts about 
public employment levels over time and across countries, none of these hypotheses 
appears to provide a clear rationale for the structural dimension, that is, a relative change 
of public employment at the subnational government level compared to that at the central 
government level. Decentralization helps us to explain the change of the structural 
dimension of public sector employment. With fiscal decentralization policy, the central 
government transfers some responsibilities to the subnational governments. As a result, 
we expect that the level of public sector employees at the central government level 
decreases and that at the subnational government level increases with the degree of fiscal 
decentralization. The overall impact of fiscal decentralization on total public sector 
employment depends on these two opposing effects. If the magnitude of the reduction in 
the central government employment overwhelms the increase in the subnational 
government employment, then total public sector employment shrinks with the degree of 
fiscal decentralization. In other words, the fiscal decentralization policy helps to retrench 
the public sector employment. On the other hand, if the magnitude of the increase in the 
subnational government employment overwhelms the reduction in the central 
government employment, then total public sector employment grows with fiscal 
decentralization. Both cases are supported by some hypotheses as we will discuss in 
Chapter Two. Moreover, we also want to see what factors might affect the magnitudes of 
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these two effects. 
While using the relative change of public employment at the subnational 
government level compared to that at the central government level to explain the 
variation in public employment across countries, we should not ignore the potential role 
played by “spatial effects,” that is policy makers may be affected by their “neighbors” 
when they design their fiscal policy. The first explanation for the existence of spatial 
effects is that there exists externalities across countries and, therefore, fiscal policy 
choices are interactive. A second explanation is that citizens can evaluate the 
performances of their policy makers by comparing the same policy choices taken by the 
neighboring countries (Redoano, 2003).4 Given the relevance of these two explanations, 
we will test for the presence of spatial effects as a determinant of the level of one 
country’s public sector employment. 
Public sector employment is different from private sector employment in that the 
decision-making on public sector employment and wage determination occurs in a 
political environment, whereas private sector decision-making takes place in a market 
environment (Ehrenberg & Schwarz, 1986; Gregory & Borland, 1999). Politician or 
bureaucrats might have goals that are different from those of the owners of private sector 
firms. Due to such differences, we could understand public sector employment only by 
considering the public labor market as a separate entity. 
In this dissertation, we develop a theoretical model of public employment in an 
attempt to offer a different hypothesis that has the potential of explaining the structural 
variation in public employment and perhaps the time-series and cross-sectional variations 
in public employment. In the empirical chapter of the dissertation, we use two separate 
                                                 
4 The second explanation is known as yardstick competition, initially explored by Besley and Case (1995). 
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datasets to test the hypotheses derived from our theoretical model. The main goal of this 
dissertation is to analyze the role of fiscal decentralization policy on public sector 
employment. Furthermore, we want to find out the determinants of public employment at 
the central and subnational government levels and to the aggregate level as well. Besides, 
we also want to detect whether there exists evidence of spatial effects in determining the 
level of one country’s public sector employment. This dissertation consists of five 
chapters. In the current chapter, we motivate the main topic of this research. In Chapter 
Two, we review and summarize previous research on public sector employment and its 
relationship with fiscal decentralization. In Chapter Three, we develop a theoretical 
model to analyze the relationship between the degree of fiscal decentralization and public 
sector employment level. In Chapter Four, we describe the dataset we use in this study 
and present the empirical results based on the data we have. Chapter Five offers the 
conclusion.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter, we review previous studies on public sector employment, and then 
we discuss why fiscal decentralization might play an important role in the determination 
of public sector employment. In the first section of this chapter, we discuss several 
hypotheses, as suggested by previous studies, which can help to explain the difference of 
public sector employment among regions within a country and across countries. In the 
second section, we discuss why fiscal decentralization policy might influence public 
sector employment. In the third section, we review literatures of fiscal policy interaction 
across countries, while our focus is on the expenditure side. 
 
Three Hypotheses on Public Employment 
In this section, we discuss three hypotheses that seek to explain the difference in 
public sector employment across countries. The first hypothesis is Wagner’s law. It argues 
that economic development creates demand for new types of government service. The 
second hypothesis is the rent-seeking hypothesis, as first suggested by Gelb et al. (1991). 
This hypothesis argues that public employment is viewed as a means by politicians to 
conceal redistribution in favor of specific groups. The third hypothesis is the social 
insurance hypothesis, as suggested by Rodrik (1996). This hypothesis argues that public 
employment could be used to buffer the population against external risk. We review these 
three hypotheses in turn and then report on empirical studies that have found support for 
each of these hypotheses.
                                                                                                                                       8 
  
Wagner’s Law 
First, Wagner’s law argues that economic development creates demand for new 
types of government services. In other words, government services rise at a faster rate 
than economic development. Economic development clearly correlates cross-nationally 
with larger public sectors. Empirically, the size of public sector is measured in terms of 
either the share of government expenditure to gross domestic product (GDP hereafter) or 
the share of government employees to population. The size of public sector has been 
generally measured through government expenditures, but the determinants of public 
sector employment have only been discussed in a few studies, namely those by Tait and 
Heller (1984), Kraay and van Rijckeghem (1995), Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997b), Rama 
(1997),  Rodrik (1996; 1997) , Alesina et al. (2000), Alesina et al. (2001), Gimpelson and 
Treisman (2002) and Marques-Sevillano and Rossello-Villallonga (2004). These studies 
vary in their country coverage as well as in their methodology. Some of these studies are 
concentrated on a particular country, such as the case study on the United States of 
Alesina et al. (2000), the case study on Italy of Alesina et al. (2001), the case study on 
Russia of Gimpelson and Treisman (2002) and the case study on Spain of Marques-
Sevillano and Rossello-Villallonga (2004). The others are cross country studies. 
Most cross country studies confirm, or conditionally confirm Wagner’s law, such 
as in Tait and Heller (1984), Kraay and van Rijckeghem (1995), Schiavo-Campo et al. 
(1997b) and Rama (1997). Tait and Heller (1984) use a cross country dataset of 61 
countries for 1980 to investigate whether there are any common factors explaining the 
size of public sector employment.5 Their main result is that government employees per 
                                                 
5  If the data is not available for that year, they use the closest available year data. 
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capita tends to increase as per capita income rises, thus supporting the validity of the 
alternative test of Wagner’s law. Kraay and van Rijckeghem (1995) use a panel dataset of 
34 developing countries and 21 OECD countries from 1972 to 1992 to examine the 
determinants of public sector employment and wages based on an efficiency wage model. 
They find that government employment is positively associated with the resource 
constraint, which is the revenue-to-GDP ratio in the case of developing countries and 
GDP per capita in the case of OECD countries. Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997b) developed 
a cross country dataset on central and subnational government employment and wage 
statistics for almost 100 countries in the early 1990s, both advanced and less developed 
countries.6 For the entire sample, they find that the level of government employees is 
positively correlated with per capita income and thus confirm Wagner’s law. However, 
for the sample of OECD countries, this association is not statistically significant, which 
indicates that Wagner’s law may become inoperative beyond a certain level of 
development. Rama (1997) uses an unbalanced panel dataset of general government 
employment covering 90 countries for the 1970s, the 1980s, and the 1990s.7 He finds that 
at low levels of economic development, general government employment increases with 
output per capita, as predicted by Wagner’s law. However, the relationship is not 
monotonic but quadratic, with the turning point at around 14,000 dollars per capita, at 
1985 PPP prices.   
From the empirical results of these cross country studies, we find that Wagner’s 
law is confirmed, or conditionally confirmed. The interesting finding is that the public 
                                                 
6 The dataset has been updated. One more period, the year of 2000, has been added in the dataset. The 
dataset is available at http://sima-ext.worldbank.org/publicsector/, accessed June 6, 2007. Please refer to 
Footnote 3 and Appendix B. 
7 In his empirical study, Rama (1997) measures the size of public sector as the share of general government 
employees to labor force, instead of population. 
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sector employment grows with economic development but the relationship is not 
monotonic. Beyond a certain level of development, this relationship becomes 
insignificant and Wagner’s law becomes inoperative. 
 
Rent-Seeking Hypothesis 
Wagner’s law works well in explaining the levels of public employees across 
countries but not always so well within them. For example, Alesina et al. (2001) find that 
the number of public employees in the poorer regions (the South) in Italy is significantly 
larger than that in richer regions (the North). Therefore, we suspect that there would 
appear to be some factors other than economic development influencing the level of 
public employment within a country. Now, we turn our focus on the rent-seeking 
hypothesis, as suggested by Gelb et al. (1991). They develop a theoretical model to argue 
that governments in developing countries should, and do, provide valuable goods and 
services which generate a derived demand for factors of production. However, the public 
sector differs from the private sector in the extent to which the public sector is subject to 
political pressures for employment. Rent seeking and rent creating behavior can give rise 
to a wasteful diversion of resources into the public sector over and above the derived 
demand for resources. Robinson and Verdier (2002) explain why public sector 
employment is politically attractive, even that it might be socially highly inefficient. They 
argue that this is because public sector employment is a good commitment device 
between politicians and voters. From their theoretical model, they find that inefficient 
redistribution and clientelism become a relatively attractive political strategy in situations 
with high inequality and low productivity. Neither of these two studies provides empirical 
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evidence. Next we review some empirical studies that find support for this hypothesis. 
Along the same lines, Alesina et al. (2000) argue that politicians may use 
disguised redistributive policies, such as public employment, in order to circumvent 
political opposition to explicit tax-transfer schemes. Their empirical results are consistent 
with the prediction of the hypothesis in that in the United States cities politicians appear 
to use public employment as a redistributive device. They find that the city level of public 
employees in the United States is significantly higher in cities where income inequality 
and ethnic fragmentation are higher. 
Alesina et al. (2001) examine the regional distribution of public employment in 
Italy. They explain why the number of public employees in the poorer regions (the South) 
in Italy is significantly larger than that in the richer regions (the North). They compute 
the amount of expenditure on public employment due to redistribution by estimating the 
excess of public employees and wage premium in the poorer regions compared to a 
benchmark economy. They calculate that about half of the public wage bill in the south of 
Italy can be identified as a subsidy. They conclude that both the size of public 
employment and the level of public wages are used as redistributive devices. 
Gimpelson and Treisman (2002) develop a two-period game played by the central 
executive and subnational governors to explain the public employment difference at the 
regional level in Russia. In their model the politicians view public employment as a tool 
to increase their expected vote shares, by which public employment could be viewed as a 
good commitment device between politicians and voters. A number of results are 
consistent with their hypotheses. An interesting finding is that the level of public sector 
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employees at the jurisdiction with an “opposite governor” tends to be higher.8 
In summary, we find that not only economic development may influence the level 
of public employees, but some political motivations also do. However, we do not know 
any cross country study that examines empirically the rent-seeking model. We suspect the 
reason is the qualitative property of political variables. As we will cover in the empirical 
chapter of this dissertation, we know that there are some dummy variables that are able to 
describe the political relationship between the central and subnational governments. 
However, this political relationship is always a matter of degree and not a matter of a 
closed question with a yes or a no answer. Therefore, a dummy variable may be 
misleading. This problem may become more serious when we do the cross-country 
comparison.9 
 
Social Insurance Hypothesis 
Besides the hypothesis based on Wagner’s law, most studies we have discussed so 
far have argued that the difference of the level of public employment is determined by 
political reasons: governments use public employment as a tool for generating and 
redistributing rents. Rodrik (1996, 1997) suggests an alternative hypothesis to explain 
this difference: relatively safe government jobs represent partial insurance against 
undiversifiable external risk faced by the domestic economy. He argues that countries 
with great exposures to external risk are likely to have higher levels of public employees. 
Rodrik’s (1997) model shows how public employment can play a welfare-enhancing 
                                                 
8 They define an opposite local governor as a governor in ethnic republics with locally credible bases on 
which to allege central mistreatment and being affiliated with the communist opposition to incumbent 
president Yeltsin. 
9 See Chapter Four for more discussion on the political variable issue. 
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social insurance role in an economy buffered by external risks. In his empirical work, he 
uses the Labor Market Data Base assembled by the World Bank and the maximum 
sample size for his regression model is 76 countries (cross section data). In view of this 
small sample size, he supplements his analysis on employment with data on real 
government consumption as a share of GDP. His empirical result shows that exposure to 
external risk, measured as the share of the sum of imports and exports of goods and 
services on GDP, is robustly associated with levels of government employees across 
countries. Although there is enough evidence to suggest that the rent hypothesis cannot be 
dismissed, as discussed before, a more benign motive, that of providing social insurance 
through job creation, accounts well for cross-country differences in the extent of public 
employment. 
Rama (1997) uses the same measure of exposure to external risk as employed by 
Rodrik (1996) but increases the country sample and time period (unbalanced panel data) 
to explain the difference of the level of public employees across countries. Rama’s (1997) 
empirical work shows that the level of government employees increases significantly 
with exposure to external risk, as first claimed by Rodrik (1997). 
There are still some other factors that have been found to be able to explain the 
differences in the level of public employees across countries. For example, Kraay and van 
Rijckeghem (1995) find that the level of government employees is negatively associated 
with government debt. Besides this, they also find that governments hire counter-
cyclically and according to the degree of urbanization. Political pressure, caused by high 
unemployment rates, might raise demand for public sector jobs as a counter-cyclical 
device. In addition, urbanization stimulates the demand for certain pubic services, such as 
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infrastructure, social order etc., which drives the public sector to increase government 
employees. Rama (1997) points out that the level of public sector employees appears to 
be higher in Latin America and South Asia. The hypothesis that all the regional dummies 
are equal to zero is rejected at the 5% significant level. Therefore, regional features may 
explain a certain portion of the variance in government employment across countries. 
Marques-Sevillano and Rossello-Villallonga (2004) argue that the difference could be 
explained by the dependency ratio.10 They find that the number of public employees at 
the regional government in Spain increases with the dependency ratio. This is because the 
dependency ratio might be associated to the demand for education and health, which 
drives the government to hire more employees to provide such services. 
 
Public Employment and Decentralization in the Previous Literature 
In this section, we review the previous studies that link public sector employment 
and fiscal decentralization.11 As we have mentioned above, most of the previous literature 
does not directly discuss the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public sector 
employment, except for Marques-Sevillano and Rossello-Villallonga (2004). In the first 
part of this section, we review prior studies on the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and public sector size, measured as the ratio of either government 
expenditures or revenues to GDP. Then, we introduce Marques-Sevillano and Rossello-
Villallonga’s (2004) empirical study, which directly addresses the issue of the impact of 
fiscal decentralization on public sector employment in Spain. 
The earliest argument to address the impact of fiscal decentralization on public 
                                                 
10 They define the dependency ratio as the share of population at the age greater than 65 or less than 16 over 
total employment instead of population. 
11 For more detail about the definition of fiscal decentralization, please refer to Chapter Four. 
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sector size could be tracked back to Musgrave (1959). He argues that under a highly 
decentralized public sector, there is likely to be comparatively little in the way of 
assistance to the poor for two reasons. First, sorting out along Tiebout lines implies 
relatively income-homogeneous jurisdictions with little scope for redistribution from the 
rich to the poor within jurisdictions. Second, the fear of attracting the mobile poor with 
relatively generous support programs tends to deter the adoption of such programs. Both 
reasons suggest that the scope for public relief programs will be more constricted under a 
relatively decentralized fiscal system. In other words, a comparatively larger budget is 
expected under a highly centralized government because of a greater demand for 
assistance to the poor. 
Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980) Leviathan hypothesis is another classic argument 
in the discussion of the relationship between decentralization and public sector size. In 
their model, government is a monolithic entity, whose goal is to maximize fiscal revenues. 
This can only be limited by constitutional constraints. According to their hypothesis, 
decentralization of tax and spending decisions introduces competition among 
governmental units seeking to attract citizens and other mobile resources, and thereby 
constrains its access to tax and other fiscal instruments. In short, the Leviathan hypothesis 
implies that, other things being equal, the size of the public sector should vary inversely 
with the extent of fiscal decentralization, which is consistent with Musgrave’s (1959) 
argument. 
Both the Musgrave’s (1959) and Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980) points of view 
are based on the perspective of allocation efficiency and they support that 
decentralization would lead to a small public sector. However, there is another point of 
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view that argues the size of public sector increases with the context of fiscal 
decentralization. A first argument by Oates (1972, 1985) is that greater decentralization 
may result in the loss of certain economies of scale with a consequence increase in 
administration costs. The Leviathan hypothesis has been criticized that it ignores the 
supply efficiency. If economies of scale in the provision of public services are substantial, 
decentralization may result in a larger public sector (Stein, 1998). Moreover, since the 
central government is more likely to offer qualified people better career and individuals 
tend to choose offers with more possibilities for promotion, the resulting poor quality of 
subnational bureaucrats is likely to reduce the benefits of decentralization and result in 
weak public expenditure management and higher supply costs of public services 
(Prud'homme, 1995).  
A second argument is made on the basis of political participation by Wallis.12 
Wallis argues that since individuals have more control over public decisions at the 
subnational than at the national level, they will wish to empower the public sector with a 
wider range of functions and responsibilities carried out at more localized levels of 
government. As a result, the level of subnational government employment grows with the 
degree of fiscal decentralization. Based on these two arguments, we expect that the public 
sector tends to be larger with a higher degree of fiscal decentralization. 
In practice, there is a good number of empirical studies seeking to test the 
Leviathan hypothesis, such as Giertz (1983), Oates (1985), Nelson (1987), Wallis and 
Oates (1988), Zax (1989) and Forbes and Zampelli (1989). However, neither of these 
studies measures the public sector size by the number of public employees because the 
Leviathan hypothesis suggests to focus on the level of revenue that the state extracts from 
                                                 
12 Wallis’ argument has been cited in Oates (1985). 
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the economy.  Besides the revenue-related variables, such as government tax revenues as 
a fraction of personal income that has been used in Forbes and Zampelli (1989), Giertz 
(1976), Nelson (1987), Oates (1985) and Zax (1989), other measures, such as government 
expenditures as a fraction of personal income, are used to measure the size of public 
sector as well, for example, Giertz (1983), Oates (1985) and Oates and Wallis (1988). 
Empirically, there is no consistent evidence to support or to reject the Leviathan 
hypothesis. While Wallis and Oates (1988) and Zax (1989) find supporting evidence for 
the Leviathan hypothesis, Giertz (1983), Oates (1985), Nelson (1987) and Forbes and 
Zampelli (1989) reject it. 
So far, there appears to be only one empirical study by Marques-Sevillano and 
Rossello-Villallonga (2004), explaining how the number of public employee at the 
regional government is influenced by the process of decentralization. These authors 
define the process of fiscal decentralization as the transfer of responsibilities of education 
and health from the central to the regional governments. In their empirical study, they 
group the regional governments in Spain at that time according to whether they have 
received or not these two responsibilities to measure the process of fiscal 
decentralization.13 The regional governments with receiving both responsibilities are 
grouped as highly decentralized group. The regional governments with receiving only the 
responsibility of education are grouped as middle decentralized group. The control group 
is those regional governments with none of these two responsibilities. 
Due to the process of decentralization that started in Spain in the 1980s, 17 
regional governments have been created and public employment needs have not been 
entirely covered with employees transferred from the central government. The data from 
                                                 
13 Nowadays all regional governments in Spain have been transferred education and health. 
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their empirical study shows that the increase in the number of public employees at the 
regional government level is 1.6 times the reduction of the public employees at the 
central government during the period from 1990 to 2003. That is the number of total 
public sector employees actually increased with the process of fiscal decentralization.   
We are particularly interested in one of their empirical results. They find that the 
ratio of regional public employees to total employment is significantly greater in the 
regions receiving both responsibilities (education and health) from the central 
government vis-à-vis the rest of the regions. Our theoretical model below is inspired by 
this result. With the process of fiscal decentralization, the central government transfers 
some responsibilities to the regional governments, which drives the increase in regional 
government employees and the reduction in central government employees. The overall 
impact of fiscal decentralization on total public sector employees depends on these two 
opposing effects. If the magnitude of the increase overwhelms the reduction, then the 
number of total public sector employees increases with the process of fiscal 
decentralization. In this case, we confirm Oates’ (1972, 1985) and Wallis’14 argument that 
decentralization tends to result in a larger public sector. On the other hand, if the 
magnitude of increase is less than the reduction, the number of total public sector 
employees decreases with the process of fiscal decentralization. In this case, the point of 
view suggested by Musgrave (1959) and Brennan and Buchanan (1980) that 
decentralization leads to leaner government will be supported. 
Moreover, we are also interested in identifying any factors that may influence the 
magnitude of these two effects. In the next chapter, we develop our own model with the 
aim of better explaining the differences in public sector employment across countries and 
                                                 
14 Wallis’ argument has been cited in Oates (1985). 
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answering the question we have presented whether the fiscal decentralization retrench the 
public sector employment or not. 
 
Public Expenditures and Spatial Effects in the Previous Literature 
As indicated in Chapter One, policy makers may be affected by their “neighbors” 
when they design their policy, which is known as spatial interaction or spatial effects. 
There is now a large literature showing that spatial effects play an important role in 
determining one country’s fiscal policy. This literature has used different theoretical 
frameworks to rationalize the existence of spatial effects; these include spillover effects 
(Case et al., 1993) and yardstick competition (Besley & Case, 1995; Bordignon et al., 
2003; Revelli, 2006). Regardless of the different theoretical explanations, the empirical 
estimation of these models typically follows a common empirical framework (Case et al., 
1989). The spatial effects can be captured by using weight matrices which approximate 
the potential spatial correlation either in the dependent variables or in the error terms, or 
both.15 In this section, we focus our review on the literature on spatial interaction on the 
expenditure side of the budget, since it directly links to the topic of our study, the level of 
public sector employment. Most of the previous empirical literature has used subnational 
level data to detect special effects, for example, Baicker  (2001), Case et al. (1989), Case 
et al. (1993), Bordignon (2003) and Revelli (2006). Some other researches, such as 
Redoano (2003) and Mbakile-Moloi (2006) have used cross country data to detect spatial 
effects. Redoano (2003) found the evidence of spatial effects in terms of public 
expenditures, using a dataset for 13 European Union (EU) countries for the period 1985-
                                                 
15 The empirical model captures the potential spatial correlation in the dependent variable is called the 
spatial autoregressive model, in the error terms is called the spatial error model, and in both dependent 
variable and error terms is called the general spatial model. 
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1995.16 His empirical shows that EU countries set their public expenditures at both the 
aggregated and disaggregated levels, interdependently.  Mbakile-Moloi (2006) also 
detected evidence of spatial interaction on the expenditure side of the budget in 24 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region countries and 11 Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) countries. 17 
An interesting point of these two cross country studies is that both authors use a 
dataset of “homogenous” countries. For example, these 13 European Union countries that 
have been used in Redoano’s (2003) empirical estimation are all OECD countries. 
Meanwhile, the 11 SSA countries and 24 SADC countries being used in Mbakile-Moloi’s 
(2006) empirical estimation are all developing or undeveloped countries. The importance 
of this observation is that with a “homogenous” dataset, the presence of spatial effects 
might not be surprising since it is more possible for the policy maker of one country to be 
affected or follow the policy of the neighboring country with similar GDP level or 
infrastructure. There is also a greater chance that the spatial effects may be commingled 
with other common but unobserved factors. On the other hand, spatial effects may not 
exist between two neighbor but quite different countries, for example, one of which is 
OECD and the other is non-OECD country or one developed and the other developing. 
This is because with significant differences in institution, infrastructure and so on 
between these two countries, spillover effects may not take place and, thus, spatial effects 
may not be present. In particular, in many developing countries, politicians are not as 
                                                 
16 These countries are United Kingdom, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, Netherlands, Sweden, and Portugal. 
17 These 24 SADC countries are Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo Dem. Rep, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Gambia,  Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia,  Zimbabwe; these 11 SSA countries are 
Botswana, Congo Dem. Rep, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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accountable to voters, and, therefore, yardstick competition may not be present. Both 
arguments suggest that using a geographic border or distance to detect spatial effects 
across countries may not be appropriate if the dataset includes both OECD and non-
OECD or developed and developing countries. In this study, our dataset includes both 
OECD and non-OECD countries; therefore, the empirical methodology utilized for a 
weight matrix becomes very important. In our empirical work, we divide the countries 
into six groups: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and OECD.18 Countries in the same 
group are likely to have similar culture or socio-economy background, and are more 
likely to affect each other through spatial effects. In such a setting, given two countries 
being in the same group, these two countries are viewed as neighbors, independently of 
whether they share the same border or not. Once the way of creating our weight matrix 
has been decided, it will be used to detect spatial effects in terms of public sector 
employment level for all the countries in our dataset. The weight matrix and our 
empirical results are presented in Chapter Four.
                                                 
18 This categorization has been used in the empirical analysis of Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997b). 
                                                                                                                                        
22  
CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
In this chapter, we develop our theoretical model expanding on the work by 
Gimpelson and Treisman (2002). We model the fiscal politics that determines the level of 
public employees as a two-stage game played between the central government and a 
subnational government. Politicians in this model act as what Niskanen (1968) calls 
bureaucrats who seek to maximize their own utility function.19 According to him, there 
are several variables that may enter the bureaucrat’s utility function, such as salary, public 
reputation and output of the bureau. In our model, we assume that the bureaucrat’s utility 
function consists of two components: the level of public goods provided to the residents 
and subnational government budget gap. The bureaucrat’s utility is positively associated 
with the level of public goods provided and inversely with negative subnational 
government budget gap. 
We assume that there are two types of public goods: local public goods and 
national public goods. Local public goods are only provided to the residents in the 
particular jurisdiction following the decision of the governor in this jurisdiction. National 
public goods are provided to all residents in the country following the decision of the 
central authorities. The production functions of both public goods are of a Cobb-Douglas 
form with two inputs, labor (public sector employment) and capital, which could be 
represented mathematically as: 
βα KmKmf ⋅=),(
                                                 
19 According to Niskanen (1971), bureaucracy has two basic characteristics: they are non-profit 
organizations, and they are financed, at least in part, from a periodic appropriation or grant. 
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where m  is input of public sector employment and K  is capital input.20 We further 
assume that the production technologies of local pubic goods in each jurisdiction are 
identical. Thus, these two production coefficients, α  and β , are constant across 
jurisdictions in the country. All public expenditures go to pay the wages of the public 
employees and the capital rental costs. 
The model is set up as follows. Assume there is a country composed of one 
central government with an executive and n  jurisdictions, subscripted ni ,...,2,1= , each 
with an governor and the same number of residents. The total amount of national 
resources in this country are denoted by R , which are financed by a national proportional 
income tax, Yt ⋅ , where t  is the fixed tax rate and Y  is the real GDP. In period 1, the 
central government sets the degree of fiscal decentralization, θ , which is the share of R  
that allocates equally to the subnational governments, and the rest share, )1( θ− , is kept 
by the central government.21 We denote the amount of resource allocated to jurisdiction i  
as ir , where n
Rri
⋅= θ . Thus the budget constraints for central and each subnational 
government are R⋅− )1( θ  and 
n
R⋅θ , respectively. In period 2, the subnational governor 
in jurisdiction i  receives the transfers, 
n
R⋅θ , and sets the level of public employees in its 
                                                 
20 In reality, the public sector might have certain level of control over the prices of labor and capital; 
however, for the purpose of simplicity, we assume the prices are fixed and we normalize them to 1. This 
assumption also implies that the labor supply is a horizontal line and unemployment is not allowed. 
21 This assumption might be true, especially in developing countries. Although the subnational governments 
in developing countries have their own-source revenues, they usually do not have full autonomy in these 
revenues: subnational governments are authorized to collect the tax but not allowed to change the tax rate 
or tax base without the permission of the central government. This implies that the central government can 
decide the subnational revenue level by setting the tax rates and tax bases of subnational revenues. 
Therefore, total amount of national resources in this country are controlled by the central government. 
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jurisdiction, denoted by im . If we follow Bird and Vaillancourt (1998), this process of 
fiscal decentralization is what has been termed a delegation: the subnational governor has 
the authority to decide the level of public goods provided in this jurisdiction but the 
discretion to raise taxes is limited.22 
As we have assumed that the bureaucrat’s utility function consists of the level of 
local public goods provided to the residents and subnational government deficits, and it is 
positively correlated to the level of local public goods and inversely correlated to the 
negative budget gap,  the utility function of the subnational governor in jurisdiction i , 
)( iVE , can be shown as: 
)()1()()( iii cmfVE πσ ⋅−−=  
where im , )( imf  and ic  are the amount of public employees, the production function of 
local public goods and the subnational government budget gap ratio in jurisdiction i , 
respectively. The subnational government budget gap ratio in jurisdiction i  is defined as 
the ratio of budget gap to revenue. The subnational governor in jurisdiction i  chooses to 
hire the amount of im  public employees to maximize his utility and provide the level of 
)( imf  local public goods to the residents in this jurisdiction. We assume the production 
function is a concave function, that is, 0)(' >imf  and 0)(" <imf , 0>∀ im . The 
level of local public goods of jurisdiction i is given by βα iiii KmKmf ⋅=),( . In 
equilibrium, we have αβ⋅= ** ii mK  , and the total expenditure of jurisdiction i is 
)1(* αβ+⋅im . In addition, the production function can be reduced to 
βαββα αβαβ +⋅=⋅⋅= iiii mmmmf )()()( . 
                                                 
22 For more detail of the definition of fiscal decentralization see Chapter Four of this dissertation. 
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In the objective function, )( icπ  is the political cost function of a subnational 
budget gap, which is caused by over-staffing in this jurisdiction. We assume that the 
subnational governments are able to finance the gap via other sources, for example, 
borrowing from subnational-government-own banks. Such subnational government 
budget constraints are so-called “soft budget constraints.”23 The budget gap ratio of 
jurisdiction i  can be represented by 
i
ii
r
rm −+⋅ )1( αβ  , or 1)1( −+⋅
i
i
r
m αβ , where 
)1( αβ+⋅im  and ir  are the expenditure and revenue of jurisdiction i . 0<ic  means that 
there is a positive budget gap, 0>ic  means there is a negative budget gap, and 0=ic  
means that the budget gap is zero in jurisdiction i . We assume the political cost is zero as 
0≤ic  and it is positive and a convex function as 0>ic , that is, 0)( >icπ , 0)(' >icπ  and 
0)(" >icπ , 0>∀ ic . To assure the existence of a solution and to avoid a corner solution, 
we need further assumptions for this utility maximization problem: ∞→)(' imf  as 
0→im , 0)(' →imf  as ∞→im , 0)(' →icπ  as 0→ic , and ∞→)(' icπ  as ∞→ic .  
With soft budget constraints, the subnational governments can increase 
expenditures without eventually facing the full cost (Rodden et al., 2003). The coefficient, 
σ , with the value between 0 and 1, captures this political relationship between the central 
and subnational governments in the country. It determines the ratio of the political cost, 
)( icπ , that is shifted from the subnational governor to the central executive. So, 
)()1( icπσ ⋅−  captures the political costs that remain with the subnational government. 
                                                 
23 The term soft budget constraint was first introduced by Kornai (1992) to describe how state-own 
enterprises could rely on increased subsidies if they increased their loss. Rodden et al. (2003) provide an 
appropriate definition for our model: A soft budget constraint describes the situation when an entity (say, a 
subnational government) can manipulate its access to funds in undesirable way. 
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There are three properties in the subnational bureaucrat’s utility function. First, if 
the subnational government provides higher level of public goods, the subnational 
governor obtains higher level of utility. Second, hiring too many employees causes a high 
level of negative subnational government budget gap, which is harmful to the subnational 
governor’s utility function. In the model, )()1( icπσ ⋅−  is the penalty to the subnational 
government for over-staffing. A rational governor would set *ii mm = , such that 
01)1(
*
* >−⋅
+⋅⋅=
R
mnc ii θ
αβ , where *im  and *ic  are the reaction function of the governors 
of jurisdiction i  with respect to the central executive’s decision in period 1. The proof is 
straightforward as below: 
The utility maximization problem for the governor of jurisdiction i  is defined as: 
)()1()()(max
}{ iiim
cmfVE
i
πσ ⋅−−=         subject to     1)1( −⋅
+⋅⋅=
R
mnc ii θ
αβ . 
Solving the utility maximization problem, we have the following first order condition: 
 ( ) 01)(')1()(')( =⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⋅
+⋅⋅⋅−−=∂
∂
R
ncmf
m
VE
ii
i
i
θ
αβπσ . 
Let F  be the first order condition, and we have  
( )
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⋅
+⋅⋅⋅−−=
R
ncmfF ii θ
αβπσ 1)(')1()(' . 
The second order condition is 
( ) ( ) 21")1()(" ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⋅
+⋅⋅⋅−−=∂
∂
R
ncmf
m
F
ii
i θ
αβπσ . 
Since 0" <f , ( ) 01 >−σ , and ( ) 0" >icπ , the second order condition is negative and 
satisfied for a utility maximization problem. It implies that the solution for this utility 
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maximization problem exists. We denote the reaction function of the subnational 
governor of jurisdiction i as *im  and ),,,,,( Rnmm ii βασθ=∗ . Consequently, we have 
),,,,,(1)1(
*
* Rnc
R
mnc iii βασθθ
αβ =−⋅
+⋅⋅= . 
Since 0)(' * >imf , 0)1( >−σ  and α , β  and ir are all positive, we have 
0)(' * >icπ . Because 0)( =icπ  as 0≤ic  and )( icπ  is a convex function as 0>ic , we 
have shown that 0* >ic . 
The intuition behind this argument is that since the over-staffing cost to the 
subnational government is proportionally shared by the central government, a rational 
subnational governor would choose to over-staff until the marginal benefit of providing 
public goods equals the marginal cost he needs to bear and ask the central executive to 
pay part of the bill of subnational over-staffing. We can further show that the level of *ic  
depends on the value of σ : the higher the value of σ , the higher the level of *ic .24 
Finally, the coefficient σ  plays the essential political role in our model. Within 
the country the extent of the political cost to the governor depends on whom voters blame 
for the negative budget gap. In some countries, the public views the negative subnational 
budget gap as a failure of the negotiation and crisis management skills of the central 
government, even if objectively the subnational governments are more directly to be 
blamed. We use σ , with the value between 0 and 1, to measure the propensity of voters 
                                                 
24 Since 1)1(
*
* −⋅
+⋅⋅=
R
mnc ii θ
αβ , we have σθ
αβ
σ ∂
∂⋅⋅
+⋅=∂
∂ ** )1( ii m
R
nc . The sign of σ∂
∂ *ic  is determined by 
σ∂
∂ *im . We will show that 0
*
>∂
∂
σ
im  in Proposition 3 below. Since σ∂
∂ *im  is positive, we know that σ∂
∂ *ic  is 
positive as well. 
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to blame the central government rather than the subnational government for the negative 
budget gap of their jurisdiction. The higher the value of the political variableσ , the larger 
the proportion of the political cost of negative subnational government gap that is shifted 
to the central executive. We expect the value of σ  is higher in some countries, where 
subnational governments have less autonomous power in comparison to other countries 
with a lower value of σ , where subnational governments have more autonomy, in 
particular autonomy to raise their own taxes. For example, in countries like Greece and 
Hungry, the subnational governors do not have power to collect a new tax or even raise or 
reduce the tax rate. 25 They can only execute the expenditure or revenue policies enacted 
by the central government and act as the agent of the central government executive. 
Under these circumstances, subnational governments can more easily shift the political 
costs of negative subnational budget gap to the central government. On the other hand, in 
other countries, like the United States and Canada, each subnational government has 
more autonomy in managing subnational government finances. Thus, subnational 
governors in these countries would have to bear a larger part of the penalty of the 
negative subnational government gap. 
Now let us turn our attention to the central government executive’s utility 
maximization problem. The central government executive’s utility consists of two 
components: the level of national public goods provided to all residents in the country 
and negative subnational government budget gaps. As was in the case of the subnational 
governor utility, the central government executive’s utility is positively correlated to the 
level of national public goods and is negatively correlated to the negative subnational 
                                                 
25 We will discuss more detail about the political variable in the next chapter. 
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budget gap. The central government executive’s utility function, )( cVE , can be shown as: 
∑
=
⋅−−=
n
i
ic cgVE
1
)()1()( πσθ   
where )1( θ−g  can be viewed as the production function of national public goods.26 The 
coefficient σ  is the share of the political cost of negative subnational government budget 
gaps that the central executive has to bear, and ∑
=
n
i
ic
1
)(π  is the total subnational 
government budget gaps in the country. Again, we assume the production function is a 
concave function, that is, 0)'1( >−θg  and 0)"1( <−θg , 1)1(0 <−<∀ θ . The central 
executive chooses a degree of fiscal decentralization to maximize his utility. To assure the 
existence of an inner solution, we further assume that ( ) ∞→− '1 θg  as 1→θ , and 
( ) 0'1 →−θg  as 0→θ . In equilibrium, the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization can 
be shown mathematically as ),,,,( Rnβασθθ =∗ . Once *θ  is determined, the optimal 
level of central government employees, *cm , is also determined, which is given by 
( ) ( )RnmRm cc ,,,,1 ** βασθβα α =⋅−⋅⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ += .  
There are two important properties of the central executive’s utility function. First, 
the utility increases with the provision of national public goods, ( )θ−1g , as was the case 
for the subnational governor. Second, the central government executive has to bear part 
of political cost caused by the negative subnational government budget gap, which is 
                                                 
26 We assume that there is no budget deficit problem in the central government level, and, therefore, the 
total expenditure for the central government is ( ) R⋅−θ1 .  Given the property of production function of a 
Cobb-Douglas form and total expenditure of the central government, we can know the level of national 
public goods provided.  If we release this assumption and allow the central government has a limited 
budget deficit, our result will be essentially the same. 
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harmful to the central executive’s utility. The share that the central government has to 
bear is σ ; as a result, the penalty function for the central government is given by 
∑
=
⋅
n
i
ic
1
)(πσ . 
The intuition of our theoretical model is that the subnational governor’s objective 
is to maximize his utility and the only way to do so is through providing more local 
public goods to his constituency. However, given the subnational government budget 
constraint, providing too much public goods causes high level of negative subnational 
government budget gap, which lowers his utility. Therefore, there is a trade-off between 
providing local public goods and bearing negative budget gap in the subnational 
governor’s decision. By the same token, the central government executive’s objective is 
to increase his utility.  He can increase his utility through providing more national public 
goods to the people in this country. The only way for the central government to provide 
more national public goods is to set up a lower degree of fiscal decentralization. However, 
a very low degree of fiscal decentralization ratio means a very low level of resources 
going to the subnational government, which causes a high level of negative budget gap in 
the subnational government and indirectly lowers his utility.27 This is because in some 
countries, the public views negative subnational budget gaps as a failure of the 
negotiation and crisis management skills of the central government, even if objectively 
the subnational governments are more directly to be blamed. Therefore, both the central 
government executive and the subnational governor need to bear the political cost of 
                                                 
27 For example, if 0→θ , then 0)'1( →−θg  and ∞→ic . Based on the inner solution assumption for 
subnational governor’s utility maximization problem, we know ( ) ∞→icπ  as ∞→ic . Therefore, if 0→θ , 
then −∞→)( cVE . This implies that a rational central executive will not set up a zero degree of fiscal 
decentralization.  
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negative subnational budget gaps. We introduce a political variable, σ , into our model to 
represent the share of the political cost of negative subnational budget gaps that the 
central executive has to bear. We again see a trade-off relationship between setting up a 
lower degree of fiscal decentralization and bearing the cost of negative subnational 
budget gaps in the central executive’s decision. In addition, these two decision makers are 
linked by the political variable, σ . In our Proposition Three we show that the political 
variable plays an important role in determining the level of public employees at both the 
central and subnational governments. 
Figure 1 helps us understand the intuition of our model. The purpose of building 
this theoretical model is to find out the effect of some exogenous variables on the 
subnational governor’s decision of hiring public employees and the central government 
executive’s decision of choosing the degree of fiscal decentralization. Moreover, we want 
to examine how the central government executive’s decision affects the subnational 
governor’s decision. In order to investigate the interaction of the decisions of the central 
government executive subnational governor, we use, as already mentioned, a game 
theoretic approach. We can solve the two-period-two-player game by applying backward 
induction.28 In period 2, the subnational governor in jurisdiction i  sets the level of public 
employees in this jurisdiction, im , to maximize his utility function: 
)()1()()(  max
}{ iiim
cmfVE
i
πσ ⋅−−=     subject to    ( ) 11 −⋅
+⋅⋅=
R
mnc ii θ
αβ .       (1) 
By solving the maximization problem, we have the following first order condition: 
                                                 
28 Since we assume that these n jurisdictions are all identical, we can focus on one particular subnational 
governor’s reaction to the central executive’s decision. Of course, this assumes that subnational 
governments do not collude among themselves and that every subnational government is too small to really 
affect what happens to other subnational governments. 
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Denote the reaction function of the subnational governor in jurisdiction i as 
( )Rnmm ii ,,,,, βασθ=∗  and, therefore, we have ( ) ( ) 11,,,,, ** −⋅ +⋅⋅= RmnRnc ii θ αββασθ . 
The second order condition, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 21"1" ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⋅
+⋅⋅⋅−−=∂
∂
R
ncmf
m
F
ii
i θ
αβπσ , has been 
shown to be negative and satisfied for a utility maximization problem, which assures the 
existence of the solution.29 
In period 1, the central government executive sets the degree of fiscal 
decentralization, θ  , to maximize his utility function: 
∑
=
−−=
n
i
ic cgVE
1}{
)()1()(  max πσθθ     subject to    
( ) 11** −⋅
+⋅⋅=
R
mnc ii θ
αβ .         (3) 
We insert the constraint into the objective function and the central government 
executive’s utility maximization problem can be shown as: 
( ) ( ) ( )∑
= ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⋅
+⋅⋅−−=
n
i
i
c R
mngVE
1
*
}{
111  max θ
αβπσθθ . 
The corresponding first order condition is 
( ) ( ) ( ) 01'1'
1
=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
∂⋅⋅
+⋅⋅−−−=∂
∂= ∑
= θθθ
αβπσθθ
ii
n
i
c mm
R
ngVEG .                         (4) 
We assume that the second order condition is satisfied for this utility maximization 
problem, which implies 0<∂
∂
θ
G . This assures the existence of the solution of the central 
government. We denote the solution to the central government executive’s utility 
                                                 
29 Please see the proof of the second property of the subnational bureaucrat’s utility function. 
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maximization problem as ( )Rn,,,, βασθθ =∗  and, therefore, the level of central 
government employment is determined by ( ) ( )** 1,,,, θβααβασ −⋅+⋅== RRnmm cc . 
Total public sector employment and the degree of fiscal decentralization in this 
country can be shown mathematically as:  
( ) ( ) ( )RnmRnmnRnmmnmm icic ,,,,,,,,,,,,, ***** σβαβασθβασ =⋅+=⋅+=  
and 
( )Rn,,,, σβαθθ =∗ . 
We are now ready to derive some propositions, which help us to establish the 
potential impact of some exogenous variables on the subnational governor’s decision of 
hiring public employees and the central government executive’s decision of choosing the 
degree of fiscal decentralization. In addition, we will be able to predict the reaction of the 
subnational governor to the central executive’s decision. 
Proposition One: The reaction function for the level of public employees in 
jurisdiction i , *im , increases with the degree of fiscal decentralization, θ , decided by the 
central government in period 1. In addition, that the optimum level of central government 
employment, *cm , decreases with the degree of fiscal decentralization. Thus, the impact of 
fiscal decentralization on total public employees is ambiguous. 
First, we prove that the reaction level of public employees of the subnational 
government i, *im , increases with the degree of fiscal decentralization. The function F  
denotes the first order condition of the utility maximization problem of the subnational 
governor in jurisdiction i, and we have 
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Applying the implicit function theorem, we have 
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      (5) 
Since 0"<f  and 0">π , the sign of Equation (5) is positive, which satisfies our 
expectation. The higher the degree of fiscal decentralization, the higher the share of 
national resources that go to the subnational governments and the less the national 
resources that are controlled by the central government. Since all the expenditures are 
exhausted to pay the wage of public employees and the capital rental costs, a high degree 
of fiscal decentralization would drive the level of subnational government employees to 
increase. 
Second, we explain why the level of central government employees, *cm , 
decreases with the degree of fiscal decentralization. Given the assumption that there is no 
budget deficit in the central government, the central government budget constraint is 
( ) R⋅−θ1 . Since there are only two inputs in the production function of public goods, the 
total expenditure of the central government can be expressed as ( )αβ+⋅ 1*cm . Given no 
central government deficit assumption, we have ( )** 1 θβαα −⋅+⋅= Rmc . From this equation, 
we know the that level of central government employees, *cm , moves inversely with the 
level of fiscal decentralization, θ . 
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Since fiscal decentralization leads to an increase in the number of public 
employees at the subnational government level and a decrease at the central government 
level, the overall impact of fiscal decentralization on total public sector employment is 
ambiguous and depends on the relative dimensions of these two opposing effects. If the 
magnitude of the former effect overwhelms the latter, total public sector employment 
increases with the degree of fiscal decentralization; otherwise, public sector employment 
decreases with it. The exogenous variable, σ , plays an important role in determining the 
magnitude of these two effects; however, from the model we cannot find this relation 
since the sign of ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
∂
∂
θσ
*
im  is ambiguous, which leaves this issue to be resolved in our 
empirical estimation. 
Proposition Two: From our theoretical model, we expect that a positive 
relationship exists between GDP and subnational government employment, but this 
relationship does not apply to GDP and central government employment. We first show 
the proof of the first part of this proposition and then present a potential reason why this 
positive relationship does not exist between GDP and central government employment 
level: 
By the chain rule, we have 
Y
R
R
m
Y
m ii
∂
∂⋅∂
∂=∂
∂ ** .                                                                                                     (6) 
To establish the sign of 
R
mi
∂
∂ *
, we apply the implicit function theorem and obtain 
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From Equation (7), we know that the sign of the first term of the right hand side of 
Equation (6) is positive. The sign of the second term of the right hand side of Equation (6) 
is positive as well because in the model we assume the national resource is financed by a 
proportional income tax, that is, YtR ⋅= . Thus, 
0>=∂
∂ t
Y
R .                                                                                                             (8) 
Inserting Equation (7) and Equation (8) into Equation (6), we have 
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The sign of Equation (9) is positive, which implies that the level of public employees of 
the subnational government i , *im , increases as GDP increases. 
Second, we want to find out the effect of GDP on the central government 
employment. Since the optimal level of central government employees is determined by 
)1( ** θβα
α −⋅+
⋅= Rmc , we have 
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The sign of Equation (10) depends on the sign of 
R∂
∂ ∗θ . To establish this, we apply the 
implicit function theorem again. The function G  represents the first order condition of 
the central government executive’s utility maximization problem, and we have 
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Applying the implicit function theorem, we have 
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The sign of Equation (11) is ambiguous by our model; as a result, we are not able to 
predict the sign of our Equation (10).30 
We explain the rationale of Proposition Two as the following. First, the inequality 
in Equation (9) satisfies our expectation. This result supports Wagner’s law, which 
indicates that economic development creates demand for new types of government 
services. In order to provide more public goods, the subnational governor has to hire 
more public sector employees. Therefore, the level of public sector employment in the 
subnational governments increases with GDP. However, according to Equation (10), we 
                                                 
30 There is a literature by Panizza (1999) that claims that the degree of fiscal centralization is negatively 
correlated with income per capita, which implies that the sign of Equation (11) is positive. 
                                                                                                                                       38 
  
are not able to determine the impact of GDP on the central government employment. The 
reason is that since the subnational government employment level increases with GDP, 
the impact of GDP on subnational government budget gap is unpredictable. If that 
increase in GDP worsens the subnational government budget gap, the central executive 
might increase his utility by raising the degree of fiscal decentralization, which lowers the 
penalty from negative subnational government budget gaps to the central executive. 
Given the level of central government employment moves inversely to the degree of 
fiscal decentralization, the increase in GDP might lower the level of central government 
employees. 
Total public sector employment of a country consists of the central and 
subnational government employees. From the first part of Proposition Two, we know that 
the impact of GDP on subnational government employment is positive, but from the 
second part we know that the impact of GDP on central government employment is not 
determined. As a result, we are not able to predict the impact of GDP on total public 
sector employment, which leaves us another empirical task, and we will cover it in 
Chapter Four. 
Proposition Three: The level of subnational government employees increases 
with the proportion of political cost caused by negative subnational governmental budget 
gap that is shifted to the central government executive; on the other hand, the central 
government employment increases with that proportion. The proof of the proposition is 
as follows: 
First, we want to prove the first part of this proposition. Applying implicit 
function theorem, we have  
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The denominator of Equation (12) is negative since it is the second order condition for 
the subnational governor’s utility maximization problem. Equation (12) implies that the 
level of subnational government employment increases with the proportion of political 
cost caused by the negative subnational government budget gap that the central 
government has to bear. 
Next, we want to determine the impact of the proportion of political cost of 
negative subnational government budget gap that is shifted to the central government, σ , 
on the level of central government employees. Since ( )** 1 θβαα −⋅+⋅= Rmc , we have 
σ
θ
βα
α
σ ∂
∂⋅+
⋅−=∂
∂ ** Rmc .                                                                                            (13) 
Equation (13) shows that σ∂
∂ *cm  and σ
θ
∂
∂ *  have opposite signs. Although we cannot 
derive the sign of σ
θ
∂
∂ *  from implicit function theorem directly, we can still determine it 
indirectly from some equations we have had so far. By the chain rule, we have 
σ
θ
σ
θ
∂
∂⋅∂
∂=∂
∂ i
i
m
m
. According to Equation (12), we have known that 0
*
>∂
∂
σ
im . From our 
Proposition One, we know that 0
*
>∂
∂
θ
im .31 Thus, we know that 0
*
>∂
∂
σ
θ . According to 
Equation (13), 0
*
>∂
∂
σ
θ  implies that 0
*
<∂
∂
σ
cm . 
                                                 
31 Refer to Equation (5). 
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The overall effect of this political variable on the total public sector employment 
is ambiguous and depends on the impact of political cost on the central and subnational 
government employment, that is, it depends on the magnitudes of σ∂
∂ *im  and σ∂
∂ *cm . The 
intuition of this proposition is quite straightforward. If the subnational governor is able to 
shift the political cost of negative subnational budget gap to the central executive easily, 
he is likely to hire more public employees to increase their utility and ask the central 
government executive to pay the bill. To reduce the disutility from negative subnational 
budget gap, the central government executive has to transfer a larger proportion of 
resource to the subnational governments. This reduces the public employees at the central 
government. The impact of the political variable on total public sector employment 
depends on these two opposing effects. If the increase of subnational government 
employees overwhelms the reduction of central government employees, total public 
sector employment increases with that political variable. If not, total public sector 
employment decreases. So the overall effect is not determined a priori and will have to be 
established empirically. 
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Figure 1: The Intuition of the Theoretical Model 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
In the current chapter we develop the empirical framework that will support the 
estimation and also present the results. We start by defining public sector employment 
and some of the difficulties of defining this variable in the first section. Then in second 
section we define our measure of fiscal decentralization and also elaborate on some 
difficulties related to this variable. In the third section we restate our hypotheses derived 
from our theoretical model. In the fourth section we discuss how we apply the 
quantitative variable to the political variable we have introduced in our theoretical model. 
Then we review some econometric issues related to the estimation in the fifth section. In 
the final section we present the results and compare them to the previous findings in the 
literature. 
 
The Definition of Public Sector Employment 
Our first task is to define the term “public sector employment.” Public sector 
employees can be categorized according to their occupation, their employment status, and 
who pays their salary. These criteria result in a complex array of cross-cutting public 
employment categories and many gray definitional areas. Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997a, 
1997b) point out some problems while defining public sector employment. For example, 
in some countries teachers and health workers are included in the public sector 
employment, while in other countries they are not. In some countries, paramilitary 
personnel are included in the public sector employment because they have a role in 
maintaining public order, while in other countries they are considered as military
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personnel. Moreover, in some countries if the state/regional and local government 
employees are paid from the central budget then they are still considered as subnational 
government staff, whereas other countries designate them as central government staff. It 
is not always clear how different countries define public sector employment, which 
complicates the comparison of public sector employment across countries. In order to do 
cross-country comparison of public sector employment, especially at the central 
government and subnational government levels, we need reliable and comparable data. 
The study by Tait and Heller (1984), as we have reviewed in the Chapter Two of 
this dissertation, represents a beginning in the effort to assemble the statistics for an 
international comparison of public sector employment and pay. They conducted a survey 
from 64 International Monetary Fund (IMF hereafter) member countries in 1980. 
According to them, public sector employment may occur at the central government level, 
subnational government level and in the nonfinancial public enterprise sector. General 
government employment is defined to include both central government and subnational 
government employment. Public sector employment combines employees in the central 
government, subnational governments and the nonfinancial public enterprise sector. 
The main problem in this dataset is the functional category problem. The 
functional category problem means the vertical distribution variation in public sector 
employment across countries. For example, in most federal countries, important 
education, health, police and administrative responsibilities are delegated to the 
subnational government level. It is meaningless simply to compare the number of central 
government employees across countries without taking into account that the central 
government in one country may perform many of the functions that in another country 
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are performed at the subnational government level. In this respect, their definition may 
not always be satisfactory. Therefore, we need a sufficiently disaggregated database if our 
goal is to compare public employment at the central and subnational government levels 
across countries. 
In their paper, Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997b) developed a dataset, the World Bank 
Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset, on central and subnational government 
employment and wage statistics for almost 100 countries for 1995, including both 
advanced and less developed countries.32 In this dataset, education, health, and police 
employees are excluded from both the central and subnational government employees, 
and are calculated as a specific category. Most of the data were individually checked and 
verified with primary sources. As a result, this dataset allows us to examine the 
comparable data on central and subnational government employment; we believe this 
dataset to be the most reliable one. 
The definition of public sector employment of Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997b) is 
based on the United Nations System of National Accounts,33 according to which, 
“general government employees” comprises six mutually exclusive categories:34 
(1) Armed Forces: covers all enlisted personnel (including conscripts) and 
professional military. Where possible, administrative employees of the Ministry of 
Defense have been excluded and are accounted for as civilian central government 
employees. 
                                                 
32 The dataset has been updated. One more period, the year of 2000, has been added in the dataset. The 
World Bank Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset website is:  
http://sima-ext.worldbank.org/publicsector/, accessed June 11, 2007. Please refer to Footnote 3 and 
Appendix B. 
33 Statistical Office of the United Nations, "International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic 
Activities, Third Revision," Statistical Papers Series M No. 4, Rev. 3, United Nations, New York, 1990. 
34 For more detail of this definition of public sector employment refer to Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997a). 
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(2) Civilian Central Government (excluding education, health, and police): 
includes central executive and legislative administration in departments directly 
dependent on the Head of State or the Parliament, together with all other ministries and 
administrative departments, including autonomous agencies. Education, health, and 
police employees paid by central government are accounted for separately. 
(3) Subnational Government (excluding education, health, and police): 
encompasses all government administration employees who are not directly funded by 
the central government. It includes municipalities, as well as regional, provincial, or state 
(in federal systems) employment. The distinction between central and subnational 
government employment is budgetary, not geographic. If central government agencies are 
geographically dispersed, but without changing their ultimate sources of finance, then the 
staff in those agencies are included in the central government employees. 
(4) Health employees: covers medical and paramedical staff (doctors, nurses, and 
midwives) and laboratory technicians employed in government hospitals and other 
government health institutions at all levels of government. Where possible, administrative 
employees working in the health sector have been excluded and are accounted for as 
civilian central government or subnational government employees, as appropriate. 
(5) Education employees: covers primary and secondary public education 
employment. Where possible, administrative employees of the Ministry of Education or 
local school systems have been excluded and are accounted for as civilian central 
government or subnational government employees, as appropriate. 
(6) Police: includes all personnel - whether military, paramilitary or civilian - that 
exercise police functions. This includes corps like Gendarmerie and Carabinieri. However, 
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as a matter of convention, it does not include border guards. Police employment data 
have been included, when readily available, but have not been gathered systematically. If 
a police number is not available, these data are captured in the civilian central 
government or subnational government categories. 
Total public sector employment comprises general government employment and 
employment in public enterprises (also called state-owned enterprises) that are majority 
owned by government. The basic classification of public sector employment can be 
represented visually as in Figure 2.35 
Although this dataset is more reliable and better defined, there are only two 
periods of data so far, the years of 1995 and 2000. With this dataset we have 62 countries 
covering both periods and 46 countries with only one period. Since this dataset consists 
of only two periods and some countries only have one period data, we can only do 
pooling cross-sectional analysis and include a time dummy variable to control for time 
effect.36 We use the central government and subnational government employee data in 
this dataset to investigate the relative change of subnational government employment to 
central government employment. 
Table 1 presents the unweighted average of the central and subnational 
government employees as a percentage of population for OECD and Non-OECD 
countries at the years of 1995 and 2000 in our estimation, based on the World Bank 
Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset. We find that both the unweighted averages 
of the level of central and subnational government employees for all countries in our 
                                                 
35 Figure 2 is revised of Figure 1 of the World Bank Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset website: 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/crosschart.gif, accessed June 11, 2007. 
36 Please refer to Appendix B. After adding in other control variables into the estimation, we have a sample 
size of 57 observations. 
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sample grow from 1995 to 2000. The level of central government employees as a 
percentage of population for OECD countries is 1.81 in 1995 and 2.25 in 2000 while that 
for non-OECD countries is 1.05 in 1995 and 1.21 in 2000. However, this is not the case 
of subnational government employment. The average level of subnational government 
employees as a percentage of population for OECD countries increases from 2.43 in 1995 
to 3.01 in 2000 while that for non-OECD countries decreases from 0.74 in 1995 to 0.39 
in 2000. Let us turn our attention to take a closer look to the difference in central and 
subnational government employments between OECD and non-OECD countries. The 
difference in the level central government employees as a percentage of population 
between OECD and non-OECD countries is 0.76 in 1995 and 1.04 in 2000. Meanwhile, 
the difference in the level of subnational government employees is quite significant and 
the magnitude increases from 1.69 in 1995 to 2.62 in 2000. Figure 3 helps us to visually 
understand this relative change of central and subnational government employment for 
OECD and non-OECD countries in these two periods. 
Since the determinants of public sector employment are likely to include its 
domestic, either political or social, conditions, we are not able to capture this individual 
effect by using a cross-sectional dataset. Therefore, we need a more complete dataset 
covering more periods, which allows us to perform some econometric models to control 
for the individual country effects. For our empirical work, we also adopt a dataset from 
the International Labor Organization (ILO hereafter), or the International Labor 
Organization Public Sector Dataset. The most important international concept of the 
public sector is contained in the System of National Accounts (Hammouya, 1999).37 
According to which, the public sector is defined as all market or non-market activities 
                                                 
37 Please refer to Footnote 33. 
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that are controlled and mainly financed by public authority. Public sector employment 
comprises employees in the public sector, namely the general government sector and the 
public corporation sector. 
The ILO defines the general government employees as the employees in all 
government units, social security funds and other nonprofit institutions that are controlled 
and mainly financed by the public authority. It consists of: 
(1) Employees in the government units. The government units carry out 
government functions, and they include all bodies, departments, and establishments of 
any level of government (central, state or provincial, local) which engage in 
administration, defense, maintenance of public order, health, education and cultural, 
recreational and other social services. 
(2) Employees in the social security funds. The social security funds are social 
insurance schemes covering large proportions or the whole of community, and are 
imposed, controlled, and financed by government units. They can operate at each level of 
government. 
(3) Employees in the non-profit, non-market public or private institutions. The 
non-profit institutions are legal entities which are autonomous from government units. 
They are classified under the general government only if they are non-market, as well as 
financed and controlled by the public authority. 
The public corporation sector comprises all of the institutional units which 
produce for the market and are controlled and mainly financed by public authority. Public 
sector employees consist of the employees in the general government sector and the 
public corporation sector. Figure 4 shows the components of public sector employment 
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according to the ILO.38 
The International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset covers 108 countries 
since 1985.39 Before 1995, the data are available every five year. Since 1995, the data are 
available every year. With the property of a panel dataset, we are able to explain the 
difference of public sector employment across countries by controlling the individual 
country effect. As we stated above, it does not make much sense to simply compare the 
number of central government employees across countries without taking into account 
that the central government in one country may perform many of the functions that in 
another country are performed at the subnational government level. Our way of dealing 
with this issue is to use the wider concepts of public sector, namely total public sector 
employment, as suggested by Marinakis (1994), which makes the cross-country 
comparisons more homogeneous. That is, we use the total public sector employee data of 
this dataset as the dependent variable and try to find out what factors might explain the 
variation of public sector employment across countries and over time. 
Table 2 shows the unweighted average of total public sector employees as a 
percentage of population of OECD and Non-OECD countries of the years of 1985, 1990, 
1995, 2000, and 2005 in our estimation, based on the International Labor Organization 
Public Sector Dataset. 40 From this table, we find that the average level of public sector 
employment for OECD countries is higher than that for non-OECD countries in each 
period. The average level of public sector employment for OECD countries is quite stable 
                                                 
38 Figure 4 is a reconstructed version of Hammouya (1999). 
39 The International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset website is http://laborsta.ilo.org/, accessed 
June 11, 2007. The data have been revised in Appendix A. Please refer to Footnote 2. 
40 For the purpose of comparing the data after 1995 to the data of the years of 1985, 1990, and 1995, we 
calculate the 5-year average from 1996 to 2000 for the year of 2000. Since the dataset has the public sector 
data up to 2004, the value of the year of 2005 is calculated by averaging four year data from 2001 to 2004. 
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over time around 10 employees as a percentage of population but that for non-OECD 
countries increases over time except for the period 1990-1995, which is 3.55 employees 
as a percentage of population in 1985 and 7.99 in 2005. We also find that the difference 
in average level of public sector employment between OECD and non-OECD countries is 
decreasing over time, which is 7.07 employees as a percentage of population in 1985 and 
1.75 in 2005. Figure 5 depicts the time trend of average level of public sector 
employment for both OECD and non-OECD countries since 1985. 
 
The Definition of Fiscal Decentralization 
The second task is to define fiscal decentralization and how we measure it in 
empirical analysis. Decentralization appears to be so widespread because there is often 
confusion in the terminology (Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 1997). Three varieties of 
fiscal decentralization may be distinguished, corresponding to the degree of independent 
decision-making exercised at the subnational government level (Bird & Vaillancourt, 
1998). 
First, what many governments call decentralization is the geographical 
deconcentration of central government bureaucracy and service delivery. Deconcentration 
means dispersion of responsibilities within a central government to regional branch 
offices or subnational administrative units. This process of deconcentration increases 
effectiveness and flexibility  in the delivery of central government services by providing 
service through regional or local offices of the central government, but it has nothing to 
do with fiscal decentralization. Under deconcentration, decision-makers in the 
subnational government level respond to central authorities but not to local constituencies. 
                                                                                                                                     51 
  
The second type of fiscal decentralization is delegation. The process of 
decentralization by delegation is that the central government gives the subnational 
governments the power to perform functions and to raise resources according to explicit 
norms and rules with the understanding that these powers can be changed or revoked by 
the central authorities. The degree of discretion in providing services and raising tax is 
often constrained by central government rules. During the process of decentralization by 
delegation the power remains within the central government. Thus the process of 
decentralization by delegation may be better identified with unitary forms of government. 
The third type of fiscal decentralization is devolution. Decentralization by 
devolution is a process in which subnational governments have a more permanent right to 
govern their own affairs with little meddling by the central authorities. In a devolved 
system, subnational governments have their own-source revenues as well as discretion to 
determine the mix of services. 
The process of fiscal decentralization in our theoretical model, as discussed in 
Chapter Three, is delegation since the subnational governor has the authority to decide 
the level of public goods provided in this jurisdiction but the discretion to raise taxes is 
limited. Now we need to explain how we measure fiscal decentralization. The measure of 
decentralization used in most of the literature is the subnational share of total government 
spending/revenue, among which we will use the subnational share of expenditure to 
measure the degree of fiscal decentralization in the course of this research. Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab (2003) and Bird (2000) have noted, among many others, that the 
subnational share of total expenditures or revenues can be quite misleading. Nevertheless, 
they use these conventional measures. 
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Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) examine the accuracy of decentralization studies that use 
the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFS hereafter) of the IMF by comparing 
these results with those obtained from a more complete OECD dataset. They argue that 
when using the subnational share of expenditures or revenues in empirical studies on 
fiscal decentralization, some problems emerge. First, the GFS does not identify the 
degree of subnational expenditure autonomy. Second, the GFS does not distinguish the 
sources of tax and non-tax revenue, intergovernmental transfers, and other grants. Third, 
the GFS does not disclose what proportion of intergovernmental transfers in conditional 
as opposed to general-purpose, and whether transfers are distributed according to an 
objective criteria or a discretionary measure. As a result of this limitation, the standard 
measure of decentralization ends up being an overestimate of fiscal decentralization and 
is far from being a perfect measure. 
In spite of this, the GFS offers a wide range of data on expenditures and revenues 
by function and economic type at all levels of government. Moreover, the GFS dataset 
goes as far back as 1970 for some countries and also offers data for many developing 
countries. In contrast, the OECD dataset suggested by Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) includes 
only six countries and information for a period of only three years (1997-1999).41 
Internationally comparable data that provide this kind of information are not available 
from other sources. Therefore, the GFS still constitutes the best source of data across 
countries, and the subnational share of expenditure/revenue, despite its acknowledged 
limitations, is still the best available measure of fiscal decentralization. 
In this study, we measure fiscal decentralization as the subnational share of public 
expenditure because we think the subnational share of revenue collection is not as good 
                                                 
41 These six countries are Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. 
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an indicator. In most developing countries, for example, China, some tax revenues are 
levied by the central government but mainly collected by the subnational government. As 
a result, locally collected revenues are not allocated by the subnational governors and the 
share of subnational government revenue over total revenue does not reflect the tax 
autonomy of subnational governors (Zhang & Zou, 1998). In addition, according to our 
theoretical model developed in Chapter Three, we use the share of subnational 
government expenditure to explain the variation of public sector employment. Therefore, 
the subnational government share of public expenditure is an appropriate measure of 
fiscal decentralization in the context of our model. Taking these into account, we focus on 
the expenditure side of fiscal decentralization, instead of the revenue side.  
Table 3 is the unweighted average of subnational government shares of public 
expenditure for OECD and Non-OECD countries of the years we use in our estimation. 
We find that the average of subnational shares of expenditure for OECD countries is 
higher than that for non-OECD countries in each period. The average of subnational 
shares of total public expenditure for OECD countries in these five periods is 31.14%, 
while that for non-OECD countries is 18.52%. The difference in subnational shares of 
public expenditure between OECD and non-OECD countries is 12.34 percentage points 
in 1985 and 16.74 in 2005. Figure 6 depicts the time trend of average of subnational 
government share of public expenditure for both OECD and non-OECD countries since 
1985. 
 
The Empirical Hypotheses 
The main purpose of this study is to analyze how fiscal decentralization policy 
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affects the composition of the public sector employment, focusing on two of the most 
important categories: central and subnational government employment. In particular, we 
also want to find out the determinants of total public sector employment. We restate the 
predictions of our theoretical model as follows: 
Hypothesis One: There is a positive relationship between the degree of fiscal 
decentralization and the subnational government employment. With a higher degree of 
decentralization, the central government allocates more national resources to the 
subnational level, which releases the subnational government budget constraint and 
induces the subnational governor to hire more subnational government employees. We 
use the World Bank Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset to test this hypothesis 
since this dataset helps us to overcome the functional category problem, and therefore, 
the data of the level of central government or subnational government employees as a 
percentage of population of different countries are more reliable and comparable. 
Hypothesis Two: The effect of fiscal decentralization on total public sector 
employees depends on the magnitudes of two opposing effects: one is the reduction in 
central government employment and the other one is the increase in subnational 
government employment. If the amount of the reduction in central government 
employment overwhelms the increase in the subnational government employment, total 
public sector employment decreases with the degree of fiscal decentralization. This is on 
line with the Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980) Leviathan hypothesis if we measure the 
government size as total public sector employees as a percentage of population. Most 
studies of Leviathan hypothesis have focused on the growth of the share of government 
expenditure as a share of GDP. However, growth in the public sector employees might 
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constitute an equally valid alternative test of this hypothesis. In short, the Leviathan 
model implies that the size of the public sector should vary inversely with the extent of 
fiscal decentralization, other things being equal. 
On the other hand, if the amount of the increase in the subnational government 
employment overwhelms the reduction in the central government employment, total 
public sector employment increases with the degree of fiscal decentralization. If this is 
the case, we would support Oates (1972, 1985) and Wallis’42 point of view that the public 
sector tends to be larger with more fiscal decentralization. We use the International Labor 
Organization Public Sector Dataset to test this hypothesis, since this dataset has more 
observations at cross-sectional and over-time dimensions. Moreover, there is no 
functional category problem while comparing the level of total public sector employees 
across countries and over time. 
Hypothesis Three: We predict that the level of GDP per capita of a country is 
positively correlated to the level of its subnational government employees. Given a fixed 
tax rate, with a higher level of GDP per capita, the subnational governor has more 
resources from the central government, which allows the subnational governor to hire 
more employees, other things being equal. Hypothesis Three is in line with Wagner’s law, 
which argues that economics development creates demand for new types of government 
services, and the government sector needs more public employees to provide these 
services. However, based on our theoretical model, this positive correlation does not exist 
between GDP and central government employment. Consequently, the overall impact of 
GDP on total public sector employment can not be determined a priori. We use both the 
International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset and World Bank Public Sector 
                                                 
42 Wallis’ argument has been cited in Oates (1985). 
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Employment & Wage Dataset to test this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis Four: We predict that the level of subnational government employees 
increases with the proportion of political cost caused by negative subnational 
governmental budget gap that is shifted to the central government,σ .43 If the subnational 
governor is able to shift the political cost of negative subnational budget gap to the 
central executive easily, he is likely to hire more public employees to increase their utility 
and ask the central government executive to pay part of the bill. In this case, the central 
government executive has to transfer a larger proportion of resource to the subnational 
governments to reduce the political cost of the negative subnational budget gaps. This 
way reduces the public employees at the central government level. The impact of this 
political variable on total public sector employment is ambiguous, due to these two 
opposing effects. We use the World Bank Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset to 
test the impact of the political variable on the relative change of public employment at the 
central and subnational governments. Then we use the International Labor Organization 
Public Sector Dataset to test the impact of this political variable on total public sector 
employment. 
 
The Political Variables 
In our theoretical model, we introduce a political variable,σ , to measure the 
ability of the subnational government to shift the political cost of the negative budget gap 
occurred at the subnational government to the central government. The higher the value 
of σ , the higher the ability of the subnational government to shift the political cost to the 
                                                 
43 We will discuss how we measure the ability of subnational governors to shift the political cost of 
subnational government deficit to the central government in the next section. 
                                                                                                                                     57 
  
central government. In Chapter Three, we present an example that in some countries, like 
Greece and Hungary, subnational governments do not have autonomous power in taxing 
or spending and we expect that such subnational governors act like the agent of the 
central executive. Therefore, the subnational governors in such countries can easily shift 
its political cost of negative budget gap to the central government and bear less part of 
political cost. On the other hand, the subnational governors in the other countries where 
they have more autonomy in subnational government finance have to bear larger part of 
political cost of the negative subnational government budget gap. As a result, we expect 
that the level of subnational government employees of a country whose subnational 
governors have more taxing and spending autonomy power is lower than that of a country 
whose subnational governors have less taxing and spending autonomy power.   
Empirically, there are no variable indicating the ability of the subnational 
government to shift the political cost of the budget deficit occurred at the subnational 
government to the central government executive. However, in the Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI hereafter) of the World Bank, we find data that are able to capture the 
autonomy power of the subnational governors.44 These data are represented by a dummy 
variable, with a value equals to one if the state/provinces have authority over taxing, 
spending or legislating and zero otherwise. The DPI covers most countries from 1975 to 
2004. However, since this dataset only has 38% non-blank observations and it might not 
be easy to simply divide countries into two groups, countries whose local governors have 
autonomy over taxing, spending and legislating and countries whose local governors do 
not have such autonomy, such a variable is not suitable for empirical analysis. In addition, 
                                                 
44 This dataset is available online at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20649465~
pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html, accessed June 11, 2007.  
                                                                                                                                     58 
  
taxing, spending and legislating are three very different things. It would be very desirable 
to capture them with separate dummy variables. Moreover, an autonomy power is always 
a matter of degree and not a matter of a closed question with a yes or a no answer. 
Therefore, a simple dichotomy might be misleading. 
Our solution to this shortcoming is to find a proxy variable to measure the degree 
of autonomous power. We use the local election variable from the DPI to deal with this 
issue. If a subnational governor is elected by local constituents, then we expect him to 
have more autonomy power and more responsibility to the local public finance. Therefore, 
if a negative subnational budget gap occurs in this jurisdiction, the locally elected 
governor has to bear relatively greater part of the penalty from the negative budget gap. 
This implies that we expect the level of subnational government employees of a country 
which subnational governors are locally elected to be lower than that of a country which 
subnational governors are appointed by the central government. 
Based on the definition of DPI, the value of this variable equals zero if neither 
subnational governor nor subnational legislature are locally elected, one if the subnational 
governor is appointed but the legislature is elected, and two if both are locally elected. 
The higher the value of this political dummy variable, the greater the responsibility of the 
subnational governor to the subnational public finance is. Since the subnational governor 
is more responsible to the subnational public finance, he will try to lower the negative 
subnational budget gap as possible as he could, and, therefore, the level of subnational 
government employment will be lower. This implies that we expect that the subnational 
government employment level decreases with the value of this political dummy variable. 
Our second political variable is also a dummy variable, which defines the 
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constitutional relationship between the central and subnational governments of a country. 
All the countries can be categorized into two groups: unitary and federal states. A unitary 
state is a country which political power mainly controlled by the central government and 
could be transferred or “delegated” to subnational government units. The central 
government retains the principal right to recall such delegated power. Moreover, any 
subnational government units in a unitary country can be created or abolished. As a result, 
we expect that the central government in a unitary country controls over relatively more 
resources of the country and provides relatively more public services to its residence than 
that in a federal state.   
Empirically, we expect that the level of central government employees in a 
unitary country is higher than that in a federal. This dummy variable equals one if the 
country is a unitary state and zero if it is a federal state.45 
 
The Empirical Issues 
Estimated Equations 
First, we want to know what factors cause the relative change of public sector 
employment at subnational government level to central government level. That is, we 
want to test the impact of fiscal decentralization, real GDP and the ability of the 
subnational government to shift the political cost of negative subnational budget gap on 
both the central and subnational government employments. To do this, we use the World 
Bank Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset to estimate the System of Equations 
                                                 
45 The list of unitary states is available online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unitary_state, accessed June 
11, 2007. Note that in many other issues of classification, this way can be misleading. For example, Spain 
is a unitary country formally, but in practice, it operates more like federation than many formal federations. 
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where the dependent variables iCGE  and iSGE  are the level of central and subnational 
government employees as a percentage of population in country i  respectively.46 The 
variable iDEC  is a measure of the degree of fiscal decentralization, defined as the 
subnational government share of public expenditure, in country i . iUNI  is a dummy 
variable, which equals one if this country is a unitary country and zero if this country is a 
federal country. iELE , a dummy variable with three values, 0, 1 and 2, is to measure the 
responsibility of the subnational governor for subnational public finance. A country with 
a higher value of iELE  means that the subnational governor in that country is more 
responsible to subnational public finance than the subnational governor in a country with 
a lower value of iELE . iW  is a set of control variables which are standard in the 
Leviathan literature, including a dummy for OECD countries, GDP per capita and the 
degree of urbanization. We also include an index for openness, measured as the sum of 
exports and imports of goods and services as a share of GDP, as suggested by Rodrik 
(1996). Finally, we put the time dummy variable, iYEAR , in our estimation model to 
control for time effect, which equals one if the data is observed for the year of 2000 and 
zero for the year of 1995. 
In our theoretical model, since the degree of fiscal decentralization and central 
government employment are jointly determined by the central executive, we should not 
                                                 
46 We will explain why we use the level of government employees as a percentage of population as our 
dependent variable in the next section. 
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include the fiscal decentralization variable, iDEC , in the first estimating equation of the 
System of Equations (14) to avoid the endogeneity problem.47 Table 4 lists the definitions 
of all variables in our model. 
According to Hypothesis One, we expect the sign of the coefficient of fiscal 
decentralization on subnational government employees, 21β , to be positive. According to 
Hypothesis Four, we expect the coefficient of the political variable, iUNI , to be positive 
in the first estimation equation and the coefficient of the political variables, iELE , to be 
negative in the second equation of the System of Equations (14). 
Second, we use the International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset to 
test the impact of fiscal decentralization, GDP, and the political variable on total public 
sector employment by estimating Equation (15): 
 tiitititititi aWELEUNIDECPSE ,,4,3,2,10, εβββββ ++⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+=                  (15)         
where the dependent variable, tiPSE , , is the level of total public sector employees as a 
percentage of population in country i  in year t . The independent variables, tiDEC , , 
measures the degree of fiscal decentralization in country i  in year t ; tiUNI ,  and tiELE ,  
are two political variables and tiW ,  is a set of control variables as we described above. ia  
is the unobserved country effect, which can be thought of as omitted variables and is time 
invariant within a country. Since the number of time periods is small relative to the 
number of observation, we could include a dummy variable for each time period to 
                                                 
47 We also suspect that the variables, subnational government employment, SGE , and degree of fiscal 
decentralization, DEC , are likely to be simultaneously related, and we conduct the endogeneity test for 
DEC  before we estimate the System of Equations (14). We will discuss the endogeneity test later in this 
chapter. 
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account for secular changes that are not modeled.48 
Brennan and Buchanan’s Leviathan hypothesis argues that the size of the public 
sector should vary inversely with the extent of fiscal decentralization, other things being 
equal, which implies the sign of the coefficient on tiDEC , , or 1β , to be negative. 49 
However, according to Oates and Wallis’ argument, the sign of 1β  is expected to be 
positive. 
Wagner’s law argues that economic development creates demand for new types of 
government services, which derives the public sector to hire more employees to provide 
these services. Consequently, Wagner’s law expects the sign of coefficient of GDP per 
capita in our control variable tiW ,  to be positive. However, our theoretical model only 
shows that GDP per capita is positively correlated with the subnational government 
employment level but not central government employment level. 
In addition, according to Kraay and van Rijckeghem (1995), we expect 
government employment to be positively associated with the degree of urbanization, 
since urbanization stimulates the demand for certain public services, which drives the 
public sector to increase government employees. Moreover, according to Rodrik (1997), 
the level of government employees increases with exposure to external risk since 
relatively safe government jobs represent partial insurance against risk faced by the 
domestic economy. 
 
                                                 
48 See, for example, Wooldridge (2000). 
49 Most empirical studies that test for Brennan and Buchanan’s Leviathan hypothesis, as we discuss in 
Chapter Two, measure the size of the public sector as the share of public expenditure on GDP, for example, 
Oates (1985), Nelson (1987), Zax (1989), and Forbes and Zampelli (1989). 
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Description of the Data 
To test our four hypotheses, we use two datasets: one is the World Bank Public 
Sector Employment & Wage Dataset, which is an unbalanced panel dataset of 108 
countries covering either the year of 1995 or 2000 or both,50 and the other one is the 
International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset, which is also an unbalanced 
panel dataset covering 111 countries with the years of 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 
2005.51 The data of fiscal decentralization are extracted from the Government Finance 
Statistics Yearbook of the IMF for these years, which is defined as the subnational 
government expenditure share of total public expenditure. The World Development 
Indicators (WDI, 2005) is the source for the control variables including GDP per capita, 
the degree of urbanization and the index of openness. Table 4 lists each variable with its 
label, definition, and units of measurement. Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of 
the variables used on the empirical estimation of the System of Equations (14). Table 6 
shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used on the empirical estimation of 
estimation Equation (15). 
 
Specification Issues of the Dependent Variables 
In our theoretical model, we derive the relationship between public sector 
employees and GDP. In practice, we divide both variables by population of the country. 
That is, our dependent variable is the number of public sector employees as a percentage 
of population and our independent variable that represents economic growth is GDP per 
                                                 
50 However, due to the limitation of other variables, the subnational government expenditure share and local 
election variable, we only have a sample size of 57 observations in our estimation.  
51 Again, after combining other independent variables, we have 41 countries covering various years. The 
sample size for this estimation is 108. 
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capita, which is used in almost all empirical studies, such as Tait and Heller (1984), 
Kraay and van Rijckeghem (1995), Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997b) and Rama (1997). 
In order to control the demographic characteristics of countries, we also use the 
number of public employees as a percentage of labor force as the dependent variable, 
which is used in Rama’s (1997) cross-country study and Marques-Sevillano and 
Rossello-Villallonga’s (2004) case study on Spain. 
 
Econometric Issues Related to Estimation of System of Equations (14) 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model: In this section, we will introduce the 
econometric methodology which we have applied to estimate our System of Equations 
(14). Our goal is to find out the impact of the degree of fiscal decentralization and GDP 
on subnational government employees as well as the impact of the ability of the 
subnational governor to shift the political cost of negative subnational budget gap to the 
central government executive on both central and subnational government employment. 
We have two regression equations of interest in the System of Equations (14). However, 
if we run the regression for each equation separately, we might find that the error terms of 
each equation are correlated to each other. For example, if there are some factors that 
affect both the dependent variables and are not in our control variables, we expect that the 
error terms from these two regressions might be correlated. 
In order to control for this, we employ the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR 
hereafter) model, proposed by Zellner (1962).52 The SUR model permits nonzero 
covariance between the error terms 1,iε  and 2,iε  for a given individual country i  across 
                                                 
52 For more detail discussion on SUR model, please refer to Appendix C or Section 15.4 of Greene (2000). 
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equations of the System of Equations (14), while assuming 0),( 2,'1, =iiCov εε , where 'i  
represents any country other than country i . These two assumptions seem reasonable in 
real world. For example, the effect of fiscal decentralization on the central government 
employment in the United States affects that on the subnational government employment 
in the United States; however, the effect of fiscal decentralization on the central 
government employment in the United States is uncorrelated with that in China. This 
potential nonzero covariance across these two equations allows for an improvement in 
efficiency of the SUR model estimator relative to the OLS estimator. Moreover, the 
greater the correlation of the residuals, the greater the efficiency gain accruing to SUR 
model. 
We report the estimation result of the System of Equations (14) by using SUR 
model in the first two columns of Table 7. In addition, in order to illustrate the efficiency 
gains of SUR model relative to OLS model, we report the OLS estimation result in the 
next two columns of Table 7. We report the robust z-statistics of OLS estimators, which 
are valid in the presence of heteroskedasticity in an unknown form. 
 Endogenous Variable: As we have mentioned above that the dependent variable 
of the second equation of the System of Equations (14), tiSGE , , and the dependent 
variable, tiDEC , , are likely to be simultaneously correlated, we might have the 
endogeneity problem in our estimation of the System of Equations (14). This endogeneity 
problem arises from the correlation between the degree of fiscal decentralization and the 
error term. If the endogeneity problem exists in our estimation model, then the estimators 
will be biased. Thus, before we add this potential endogenous variable, the degree of 
fiscal decentralization, in the model, we need to conduct an endogeneity test for it. Our 
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endogeneity test follows the regression-based approach introduced by Wooldridge (2002). 
To conduct the endogeneity test, we need to find a set of suitable instrument 
variables (IV hereafter) for this potential endogenous variable. A suitable IV must be 
uncorrelated with the error term and correlated with the endogenous variable in the model. 
According to Panizza (1999), the degree of fiscal centralization is negatively correlated 
with ethnic fractionalization. Empirically, three fractionalization indices are often used. 
Besides ethnic fractionalization, there are linguistic and religious fractionalization indices 
(Alesina et al., 2003). The fractionalization index is measured by the probability of two 
randomly chosen individuals belonging to different groups and can be shown as: 
 ∑
=
−=
N
i T
i
POP
POPIndexizationFractional
1
)(1  
where NPOP  is total population and iPOP  is the number of people belonging to group i. 
In our estimation, we use these three fractionalization indices as the IVs to test the 
endogeneity of fiscal decentralization. 
We start by estimating the reduced form of fiscal decentralization level using all 
other independent variables in the estimation of the second equation of the System of 
Equations (14) and three IVs as the independent variables. We obtain the residuals from 
this estimation and then run the regression of our dependent variable in the estimation of 
the second equation of the System of Equations (14) on all independent variables in the 
equation as well as the residuals from the estimation of the reduced form equation. The 
robust t-statistic of estimated coefficient of this error term is 1.45, with the corresponding 
p-value of 0.15. This result implies that we are not able to reject the null that the 
coefficient is zero at the conventional significance level. The insignificance of this 
coefficient implies that the degree of fiscal decentralization is not an endogenous variable 
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in our estimation model and, therefore, our estimators are unbiased.53 
Heteroskedasticity: If the residuals from the OLS or pooled OLS regression 
model are not homoskedastic, or ２)( σ≠iuVar , the estimators are unbiased and consistent 
but inefficient. In the presence of heteroskedasticity, the OLS standard errors are no 
longer valid for constructing confidence intervals and t  statistics.  
In our empirical work, we employ the White test to detect the heteroskedasticity.54 
We conduct the White test for heteroskedasticity for each equation of the System of 
Equations (14). The White’s test statistic for the first equation in the system of equation 
(14) is 52.80 with p-value of 0.33 and 33.00 with p-value of 0.42 for the second equation. 
The result fails to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity assumption and, 
therefore, we conclude that our empirical model of the System of Equations (14) satisfies 
the homoskedasticity assumption. 
 
Econometric Issues Related to the Estimation of Equation (15) 
Endogenous Variable: Our estimation of Equation (15) is based on the equation of 
),,,( **** Rnmnmm ic σθ⋅+= .  Since *cm  and *θ  are jointly determined by the central 
government executive and *m  consists of *cm  and 
*
imn ⋅ , there might be an endogeneity 
problem in the regression model of *m  on *θ .  
As we have mentioned in the case of the estimation of the System of Equations 
(14), if there is an endogeneity problem in our estimation model, we would get biased 
estimated coefficients. We conduct an endogeneity test for the indendent variable, degree 
                                                 
53 Please see Wooldridge (2002), Section 6.2, p118. 
54 We have included more detail discussion of the heteroskedasticity test in Appendix D of this dissertation. 
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of fiscal decentralization, which procedure is the same as what we have done for the 
estimation of the second equation of the System of Equations (14). The robust t-statistic 
of estimated coefficient of the error term from the estimation of the reduced form of fiscal 
decentralization is 1.38 and we are not able to reject the null that the coefficient is zero at 
the conventional significance level. The insignificance of this coefficient implies that the 
degree of fiscal decentralization is not an endogenous variable in our estimation model 
and, therefore, our estimators are unbiased. 
Heteroskedasticity: Heteroskedasticity might be a problem in our estimation of 
Equation (15), as we have discussed in the estimation of the System of Equations (14). 
We pool our panel dataset and conduct the White’s test for heteroskedasticity. The 
White’s test statistic is 93.72 and the corresponding p-value is 0.01. The result rejects the 
null hypothesis that the residuals are homoskedastic. Therefore, we have 
heteroskedasticity problem while estimating the Equation (15). In this case, our 
estimators are still unbiased on consistent but inefficient. Moreover, the normal standard 
errors are invalid for constructing confidence intervals and t-statistics. As a result, we 
need to use the robust standard errors for conducting the statistical inference since they 
are valid in the presence of any heteroskedasticity. 
Individual Effects: Consider our estimation of Equation (15): 
tiitititititi aWELEUNIDECPSE ,,4,3,2,10, εβββββ ++⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+=                  (15) 
where ia  are sometimes called an individual effect or individual heterogeneity, and the 
ti,ε  are called the idiosyncratic errors. For simplicity, we rewrite Equation (15) as: 
tititi uXy ,,, +⋅= β                                                                                                  (16) 
where tiy ,  is our dependent variable, the level of public sector employees as a percentage 
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of population of country i  at time t   and tiX ,  includes a constant term and all our 
dependent variables of country i  at time t . tiiti au ,, ε+≡  are the composite errors. Under 
the assumption that there is no correlation between tiX ,  and tiu , , the pooled OLS 
estimator can be used to obtain a consistent estimator of β  in estimation of Equation (16). 
Ignoring the individual effects, the pooled OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent if the 
individual effects are correlated with the dependent variables. If the individual effects are 
uncorrelated with our dependent variables, ignoring the individual effects and applying 
pooled OLS, the estimator might still be inefficient. This is because the composite errors 
might be serially correlated due to the presence of individual effects in each time 
period.55 In our study, we apply fixed effects and random effects approaches to control 
for the individual effects. 
The decision of applying fixed effects model or random effects model depends on 
whether or not the individual effects are correlated with our independent variables. The 
random effects model assumes the individual effects are uncorrelated with the 
independent variables. Hausman (1978) devises a specification test which can be used to 
test the correlation of the individual effects and the independent variables, as we will 
discuss in the following context. 
Serial Correlation: To estimate Equation (15), we use the total public sector 
employment data from the International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset. In 
the dataset, we have five periods, with each period covering 5 years.56 Since the data we 
use in our regression model covers for 25 years, we suspect that serial correlation might 
                                                 
55 For more detail discussion of this part, please refer to Wooldridge (2002) Section 10.3. 
56 Note that the data of the year 2005 covers only from the year 2000 to 2004. 
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be a problem. If we ignore serial correlation and estimate the variance in the usual way, 
the variance estimator will usually be biased when the parameter of the serial correlation 
is not equal to zero. 
The estimate of the first-order serial correlation, or AR(1), parameter, ρ , is 
obtained by running the regression of tiu ,  on 1, −tiu  without a constant. For each country i , 
we lose the first observation, that is, Tt ,...,3,2= . The estimated serial correlation 
coefficient, ρˆ , is 0.275 with the robust t-statistics of 1.56 for our fixed effects and 
random effects model. The insignificance of the serial correlation coefficient implies that 
there is no serial correlation problem in our estimation model.  
Testing Individual Effects versus Pooled OLS: As we have indicated before that 
ignoring the individual effects, the pooled OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent if the 
individual effects are correlated with the dependent variables. Under the assumption of 
the individual effects being jointly equal to zero, the pooled OLS estimator is the best 
linear unbiased estimator. Breusch and Pagan (1979) have derived a statistic using the 
Lagrange multiplier in a likelihood setting to test the presence of individual effects, or 
called the LM test. The null hypothesis of the absence of individual effects, statistically 
equivalent to 0: 20 =aH σ , is against the alternative hypothesis of the presence of 
individual effects, or 0: 21 ≠aH σ . Based on the residuals from the OLS estimation of 
Equation (15), we obtain a Lagrange multiplier test statistic of 60.68, which far exceeds 
the 99% critical value of chi-squared with one degree of freedom, 3.84. As a result, we 
concluded that the pooled OLS regression model with a single constant term is 
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inappropriate for our data.57 
Testing Fixed Effects versus Random Effects Estimators: The distinction between 
fixed and random effects models is the assumption whether or not the individual effects 
are correlated with the independent variables. Hausman (1978) test, based on the 
difference between the random effects and fixed effects estimates, can be used to test the 
correlation between the individual effects and the independent variables. Under the null 
hypothesis of no correlation, both fixed effects and random effects estimates are 
consistent, but fixed effects estimate is inefficient, whereas under the alternative 
hypothesis, the fixed effects estimate is consistent, but the random effects estimate is not. 
The Hausman statistic of our data is 33.06 and the corresponding p-value is closed 
to zero. This result rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation between the individual 
effects and independent variables, which implies that the random effects estimate is not 
consistent and fixed effects model is appropriate. Based on the LM test, which is decisive 
that there are individual effects, and the Hausman test, which suggest that these effects 
are correlated with the other variables in the model, we would conclude that of these two 
alternatives we have considered, the fixed effects model is the better choice. However, we 
still report both results for comparison purposes.58 
The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Estimation: Besides the fixed 
effects and random effects model estimation as discussed before, in this dissertation we 
also employ the GMM method to estimate Equation (15).59 The intuition of GMM is to 
use the moment conditions that are assumed to be satisfied to minimize the GMM 
objective function. Thus, we need to assume that the moment condition 0)'( =uXE  in 
                                                 
57 For more detail of this test, please refer to Appendix F. 
58 See Appendix G for more discussion of Hausman test. 
59 For more detail discussion on the GMM approach, refer to Appendix H of this dissertation. 
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Equation (16) is satisfied. In testing for the endogeneity of variable the degree of fiscal 
decentralization, we have a set of three additional exogenous variables. Let Z  be the set 
of our exogenous variables, including the independent variables in Equation (16) and 
three fractionalization index variables. Consequently, our moment condition can be 
rewritten as 0)'( =uZE . 
Under the condition that there are no endogenous regressors in our regression 
model and we have additional moment conditions, our efficient GMM estimator is that of 
Cragg’s heteroskedasticity OLS. This estimator is more efficient than OLS in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form and the efficiency gains drive from the 
additional moment conditions (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1992). We report our GMM 
estimation results in the third column of Table 8 and Table 9. 
Spatial Dependency Tests: As indicated in Chapter One, policy makers may be 
affected by neighboring country’s policies when they make their own policies due to the 
presence of spatial effects. Spatial autocorrelation tests, as we introduce here, are used to 
measure the degree of dependence among observations in a given geographic space. 
Currently, several statistics measuring the extent of spatial autocorrelation are available; 
among these, Moran’s I and Getis and Ord’s G statistic are the most commonly used 
statistics (Florax & van der Vlist, 2003).60 In this dissertation, we use these two statistics 
to detect the spatial effects in our dataset.  
Before conducting the spatial dependency test, we need to define an appropriate 
weight matrix to quantify the structure of spatial dependence between observations. We 
category all the countries in our dataset into six groups: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and 
                                                 
60 See Appendix I for more detail about these two spatial dependency tests. 
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former Soviet Union, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, 
and OECD. Due to the similarities in political and social-economic background of 
countries within each group, we expect that spatial effects are more likely to exist within 
groups than between groups.  Based on this spatial configuration, our spatial weight 
matrix, M, takes the form: 
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
=
0
0
1
1
L
MOM
L
n
n
M
M
M , 
where n is the number of observations. All the elements of the diagonal of M are zero. 
1=ijM , ji ≠∀ , if country i and country j are in the same group; otherwise, 0=ijM . 
 The Moran’s I statistic for our sample is 17.14; meanwhile, the Getis and Ord’s G 
statistic is 5.13. Both statistics are significant at 1% significance level.  This result 
implies that spatial effects within groups are significantly present. This also confirms 
both previous cross country spatial analysis studies of Redoano (2003) and (Mbakile-
Moloi (2006). 
Estimation Results 
Estimation Results of the System of Equations (14) 
In this section we present our estimation results of the System of Equations (14). 
The first two columns in Table 7 show the regression results for the System of Equations 
(14) by applying the SUR estimation. As indicated before, the efficiency gains of SUR 
estimation over OLS estimation comes from allowing the nonzero covariance between 
residuals from both equations. To illustrate this, we also report the estimation result by 
using OLS and put these two results together for easy comparison. The correlation of the 
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residuals from two equations in the System of Equations (14) is 0.12. 
The purpose of the estimation of the System of Equation (14) is to find out how 
fiscal decentralization policy and the political variables influence the relative change in 
subnational government employment compared to the change in central government 
employment. From Table 7 we can see that the coefficient on fiscal decentralization is 
positive at 1% significance level. The significant positive result implies that the level of 
subantional government employees as a percentage of population increases with the 
degree of fiscal decentralization, other things being equal. As we have stated in the 
previous chapter, a higher degree of fiscal decentralization means that more resources go 
to the subnational government, which allows the subnational governor to hire more 
employees. This finding confirms Wallis’s61 hypothesis that the subnational government 
tends to be larger with the extent of fiscal decentralization since individuals with more 
control over public decisions at the subnational level than at the national level may 
empower the subnational governments with more responsibilities and functions. This 
result also confirms Marques-Sevillano and Rossello-Villallonga’s (2004) study of the 
Spanish case. They find that in Spanish economy the regional governments that have 
received larger degrees of responsibilities from the central government are the ones that 
have higher levels of public employees during the period 1990-1999. 
For the political variables, we expect that the level of central government 
employees is higher in a unitary country. This is because the central government in a 
unitary country has direct authority over the subnational governments and control over 
most resource of the country, which allows the central executive to hire more public 
employees. We also predict that the level of subnational government employees is lower 
                                                 
61 Wallis’ argument has been cited in Oates (1985). 
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in a country which subnational governors are elected by local residences. This is because 
the subnational governor who are elected locally are more responsible to the subnational 
public finance and have to bear greater proportion of the cost of the negative subnational 
government budget gaps than the governors who are appointed by the central government 
since they can easily shift the cost to the central executive. As a result, the elected 
subnational governors do not allow a negative budget gap to occur or seek to lower the 
gap. Based on this argument, we expect that the level of subnational government 
employees is lower in a country which subnational governors are elected. To sum up, the 
level of public employees at the central government level tends to be higher in a unitary 
constitutional system; on the contrary, the level of public employees at the subnational 
government level is lower in the countries which subnational governors are elected 
locally. 
Our SUR estimation of the coefficients of these political variables in the System 
of Equations (14) shows that the level of central government employees in a unitary state 
indeed is higher than that in a federal country by 0.86 employees per 100 people at 1% 
significant level. This result confirms our prediction that a unitary country has higher 
level of central government employees than a federal country does. Our result also shows 
that the level of subnational government employees is lower in a country which both 
subnational governors and legislatures are elected than that in a country which the 
subnational governors are appointed but the legislatures are elected by 0.9 employees per 
100 people. This amount doubles when we compare to a country which both subnational 
governors and legislatures are appointed by the central government, other things being 
equal. 
                                                                                                                                     76 
  
Among the other control variables, we find that the level of GDP per capita is 
positively correlated to both the levels of central government and subnational government 
employees as a percentage of population at 1% significant level, which confirms 
Wagner’s law that economic development creates demand for new types of government 
services. We also find that the level of central government employees tends to be higher 
in a more opened country. The openness of a country is defined as the ratio of the sum of 
the country’s imports and exports of goods and services on GDP. This finding confirms 
Rodrik’s (1996, 1997) and Rama’s (1997) arguments that relatively safe government jobs 
represent partial insurance against undiversifiable external risk faced by the domestic 
economy. 
By comparing the estimation results of SUR approach to OLS approach, we find 
that these two results are quite the same, except for the significance level. Our estimation 
result of the System of Equations (14) tells us that the level of subnational government 
employees as a percentage of population increase with the degree of fiscal 
decentralization and tend to be lower in the country which both subnational governors 
and legislatures are elected while the level of central government employees as a 
percentage of population is higher in unitary countries. As we have stated in Chapter One, 
the variation of public sector employment could be defined in three dimensions: time 
series, cross section, and structural dimensions. The estimation of the System of 
Equations (14) explains what factors might have caused the structural change of public 
sector employment. In the next section, we will discuss the empirical results that explain 
the variation of public sector employment in time series and cross section dimensions. 
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Estimation Results of the Equations (15) 
Table 8 and Table 9 list our estimation results of Equation (15). The dependent 
variable in Table 8 is the level of public sector employees as a percentage of population. 
Since the demographic characteristics might vary across countries, in order to control 
over this, we also estimate the determinant of the level of public sector employees as a 
percentage of labor force and report the result in Table 9. The first and second columns in 
Table 8 and Table 9 are the estimation results by applying fixed effects and random 
effects approaches respectively. The third column is the estimation result by employing 
the GMM approach. The quantity in parenthesis is the absolute value of robust z-statistics, 
which is valid in the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in unknown 
form. 
First, we discuss the results of fixed effects and random effects models. The 
Hausman test helps us choose the appropriate model from fixed effects and random 
effects models. The Hausman statistic of our data is 33.06, which corresponding p-value 
is closed to zero. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
individual effects and other independent variables in the model, which indicates that the 
random effects estimate is inconsistent and the fixed effects model is the better choice. In 
the following discussion, we will focus on the fixed effects model. 
Our Hypothesis Two suggests that fiscal decentralization plays an important role 
in the determination of total public sector employment but our theoretical model does not 
give us an explicit relationship between these two variables since it depends on two 
opposing effects. From our fixed effects model estimation, we are not able to conclude 
whether fiscal decentralization is positively or negatively related to the level of total 
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public sector employees as a percentage of population. Except for the coefficients of the 
time dummies, the only significant coefficient in fixed effects model is that on local 
election. However, this coefficient is not significant in the other two models. 
As we have mentioned previously, our GMM estimation is more efficient due to 
three additional moment conditions. Indeed, our GMM estimators are more significant 
than fixed effects estimators, referring to the Table 8 and Table 9. The GMM estimation 
result shows that the degree of fiscal decentralization has a positive and significant effect 
on the level of public employees as a percentage of population at 5% significance level, 
as reported in Table 8. The magnitude of this coefficient is 0.141, which implies that a ten 
percentage point increase in the subnational government share of public expenditure 
results in an increase of 1.41 public employees, all else being equal. This finding supports 
the argument of Oates (1972, 1985) and Wallis62 but based on different explanations. 
Oates (1972, 1985) argues that highly decentralization may lose certain economies of 
scale which makes the public sector have to increase the employee level. Wallis argues 
that in a highly decentralized government, individuals have more control over public 
decisions at the subnational government level than at the central government level, and 
they will wish to empower the public sector with a wider range of functions and 
responsibilities carried out at more localized levels of government. In our theoretical 
model, we predict that fiscal decentralization policy drives the increase in the subnational 
government employment and restrains the growth of central government employment. 
Our empirical result shows that the magnitude of the increase in the subnational 
government employment is greater than that of the reduction in the central government 
employment. As a result, total pubic sector employment increases with the degree of 
                                                 
62 Wallis’ argument has been cited in Oates (1985). 
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fiscal decentralization. 
We turn our attention to the coefficient on GDP per capita, which is insignificant. 
Based on our theoretical model, we expected that the subnational government 
employment increases with GDP but the central government employment might increase 
or decrease with it. From the estimation result of the System of Equations (14), we know 
that both the levels of central and subnational government employees as a percentage of 
population increase with GDP per capita.63 But why is the impact of GDP on total public 
sector employment insignificant in the estimation of Equations (15)? There might be two 
explanations to the insignificant nature of the coefficient for GDP per capita. First, in the 
estimation of the System of Equations (14), we use the dataset from the World Bank 
Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset while we are using the ILO Public Sector 
Dataset to estimate the Equation (15). These two datasets cover different countries and 
periods and, therefore, we can have different results. Second, the definition of total public 
sector employment we used in the estimation of Equation (15) consists of seven 
categories: except for employees at the central and subnational governments, it includes 
employees in education, health, police, armed forces and public enterprises. It must be 
that public employees in at least one of these categories decrease with GDP per capita 
and, therefore, total public sector employment is not increasing with it. However, due to 
the limitation of our data, we are not able to find out which category of public sector 
employment that decreases with GDP per capita explicitly. 
Among the control variables, we find that the degree of urbanization is positively 
correlated with the level of total public sector employees as a percentage of population. 
This result is consistent with Kraay and van Rijckeghem’s (1995) finding. These authors 
                                                 
63 Please refer to Table 7. 
                                                                                                                                     80 
  
argue that urbanization stimulates the demand for certain pubic services, such as 
infrastructure, social order etc., which drives the public sector to hire more employees. 
Regarding the determinants of the level of public sector employees as a 
percentage of labor force, we find that the estimation results in Table 9 are quite 
consistent with those in Table 8. All significant coefficients in the estimation of public 
sector employment as a percentage of population are still significant in the estimation of 
public sector employment as a percentage of labor force with the same sign. The only 
difference is that the coefficient for the openness index, measured by the sum of exports 
and imports of goods and services as a share of GDP, is positively significant at 5% level. 
This finding is in line with Rodrik’s (1996, 1997) argument that  relative safe government 
jobs represent partial insurance against external risk faced by the domestic economy. 
The estimation results for the System of Equations (14) explain the structural 
change of the public sector employment. Fiscal decentralization policy shifts the central 
government employees to the subnational level, and, therefore, causes the structural 
change in public sector employment. The estimation result for Equation (15) explains the 
differences in the levels of total public sector employment as a percentage of population 
and labor forces across countries and over time. The degree of fiscal decentralization, 
political constitution, the degree of urbanization and the openness of the country help us 
to explain this variation. The level of total public sector employees as a percentage of 
population is higher in a unitary country and increases with extent of fiscal 
decentralization, as well as the degree of urbanization and the exposure to risk. The 
estimates for Equation (15) help explain why the level of total public sector employees as 
a percentage of population increases in some countries but decreases in the others during 
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the period between 1985 and 2005. They also explain why the level of total public sector 
employees as a percentage of population in some countries is higher or lower than that in 
the others at a given point of time. 
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Figure 2: The Main Components of Public Sector Employment  
According to World Bank 
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Figure 3: The Unweighted Average Level of Central and Subnational Government 
Employees for OECD and non-OECD Countries in 1995 and 2000 
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Figure 4: The Main Components of Public Sector Employment According to ILO 
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Figure 5: Time Trend of the Unweighted Averages of the Levels of Total Public 
Sector Employees as a Percentage of Population  
for OECD and non-OECD Countries 
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Figure 6: Time Trend of the Unweighted Averages of the Subnational Shares on 
Public Expenditure for OECD and non-OECD Countries 
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Table 1: The Unweighted Averages of the Levels of Central and Subnational 
Government Employees as a Percentage of Population for OECD and Non-OECD 
Countries for 1995 and 2000 
 
1995 2000 
Country 
Central 
Government 
Employees 
Subnational 
Government 
Employees 
Central 
Government 
Employees 
Subnational 
Government 
Employees 
OECD Countries 1.81 2.43 2.25 3.01 
 (20) (20) (15) (15) 
Non-OECD Countries 1.05 0.74 1.21 0.39 
 (13) (13) (9) (9) 
All Sample 1.51 1.76 1.86 2.03 
  (33) (33) (24) (24) 
The quantities in (.) are the number of observations. 
Source: World Bank Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset and Schiavo-Campo et al. 
(1997b). 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The Unweighted Averages of the Levels of Total Public Sector Employment 
as a Percentage of Population for OECD and Non-OECD Countries 
 
Country 1985 1990 1995 2000* 2005* 
10.62 10.18 9.71 10.09 9.74 
 (9) (10) (17) (20) (8) 
Non-OECD Countries 3.55 8.40 6.14 6.91 7.99 
 (4) (7) (11) (15) (7) 
All Sample 8.44 9.45 8.31 8.73 8.93 
  (13) (17) (28) (35) (15) 
The quantities in (.) are the number of observations. 
* The observation of the year 2000 is obtained as the follows: calculate the 5-
year average from 1996 to 2000 for each country, and then calculate the 
unweighted average of all countries in the group.  The observation of the year 
2005 is obtained by the same way as the year 2000, except for using the data 
from 2001 to 2004. 
Source: International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset. 
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Table 3: The Unweighted Averages of the Subnational Government Shares on Public 
Expenditure for OECD and Non-OECD Countries 
 
Country 1985* 1990* 1995* 2000* 2005* 
OECD Countries 35.96 31.36 29.99 28.20 30.19 
 (9) (10) (17) (20) (8) 
Non-OECD Countries 23.63 18.79 16.39 20.33 13.46 
 (4) (7) (11) (15) (7) 
All Sample 32.17 26.18 24.64 24.83 22.38 
 (13) (17) (28) (35) (15) 
The quantities in (.) are the number of observations. 
* These observations are obtained as the follows: calculate the 5-year average of the previous 
five years for each country, and then calculate the unweighted average of all countries in the 
group. 
Source: The Government Finance Statistics of the IMF. 
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Table 4: Description of Variables 
 
Variable Label Definition Units Source
Central Government 
Employees CGE
Central Government 
Employees as % of 
Population
%
World Bank Public Sector 
Employment & Wage 
Dataset  Website*, and 
Schiavo-Campo et al. 
(1997b)
Subnational Government 
Employees SGE
Subnational Government 
Employees as % of 
Population
%
World Bank Public Sector 
Employment & Wage 
Dataset  Website*, and 
Schiavo-Campo et al. 
(1997b)
Public Sector Employees PSE
Total Public Sector 
Employees as % of 
Population
%
International Labor 
Organization Public Sector 
Dataset  Website**
Fiscal Decentralization DEC
Share of Subnational 
Government Expenditure 
on Public Expenditure
% The Government Finance Statistics  of the IMF
Unitary Country UNI 1 for Unitary Countries 0/1 Internet***
Local Election ELE
0 if neither local governor 
nor local legislature are 
locally elected, 1 if the 
local governor is appointed 
but the legislature is 
elected and 2 if both are 
locally elected.
0/1/2
The Database of Political 
Institutions  of the World 
Bank****
OECD Country OECD 1 for OECD Countries 0/1 OECD Website*****
GDP per capita GDPPC Constant 2000 US$ 1,000 World Development Indicators (2005)
Openness TRADE
Sum of Exports and 
Imports of Goods and 
Services Measured as a 
Share of GDP
% World Development Indicators****** (2005)
Urbanization Ratio URB Share of Urban Population on Population %
World Development 
Indicators****** (2005)
*** http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unitary_state, accessed June 11, 2007
***** http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed 
June 11, 2007
****http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20649
465~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html, accessed June 11, 2007
****** Variables which resource is the World Development Indicators have the definition provided by the 
World Bank.
* http://sima-ext.worldbank.org/publicsector/, accessed June 11, 2007
** http://laborsta.ilo.org/, accessed June 11, 2007
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for the Estimation of the System of Equations (14) 
 
Variable Number of Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Central Government 
Employees (% of Population) 57 1.66 1.27 0.05 5.27 
Subnational Government 
Employees (% of Population) 57 1.87 2.09 0.20 10.14 
Fiscal Decentralization 57 24.81 13.47 5.43 57.43 
GDP per capita 57 14.76 9.16 1.82 32.52 
Openness 57 66.98 34.12 16.51 167.98 
Degree of Urbanization  57 65.92 17.48 26.17 96.62 
 
 
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for the Estimation Equation (15) 
 
Variable Number of Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Public Sector Employees  
(% of Population) 108 8.73 5.29 0.90 34.31 
Public Sector Employees  
(% of Labor Force) 108 18.55 10.33 2.04 72.72 
Fiscal Decentralization 108 25.54 14.76 2.41 59.02 
GDP per capita 108 14.72 9.32 0.67 34.84 
Openness 108 71.65 40.49 14.04 204.67 
Degree of Urbanization 108 64.84 18.98 15.53 96.98 
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Table 7: Estimated Coefficients on Central and Subnational Government 
Employment 
 
 SUR Approach OLS Approach 
 Central 
Government 
Employees (as 
% of 
Population) 
Subnational 
Government 
Employees  (as 
% of 
Population) 
Central 
Government 
Employees  (as 
% of 
Population) 
Subnational 
Government 
Employees  (as 
% of 
Population) 
Expenditure Decentralization - 0.054 - 0.055 
 - 
 
(2.82)** - (2.16)* 
Unitary Country 0.860 - 0.916 - 
 (2.81)** 
 
- (3.16)** - 
Local Election - -0.901 - -0.902 
 - 
 
(3.00)** - (2.18)* 
OECD Country -0.274 -0.156 -0.279 -0.154 
 (0.61) 
 
(0.24) (0.55) (0.32) 
GDP per capita 0.080 0.125 0.080 0.124 
 (3.04)** 
 
(3.06)** (2.72)** (3.45)** 
Openness 0.008 -0.001 0.008 -0.001 
 (2.02)* 
 
(0.11) (1.55) (0.11) 
Degree of Urbanization 0.001 0.019 0.001 0.019 
 (0.05) 
 
(1.24) (0.07) (1.48) 
Constant -0.605 -1.407 -0.652 -1.427 
 (0.91) 
 
(1.37) (1.14) (1.37) 
Observations 57 57 57 57 
R-squared   0.39 0.54 
Absolute value of z statistics is given in parentheses; for OLS estimators, robust z-statistics is given. 
In each regression model we include a time dummy, but we do not report the coefficients on that dummy. 
* and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% level respectively. 
The correlation of residuals from SUR model is 0.12. 
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Table 8: Estimated Coefficients on Total Public Sector Employment 
 
Dependent Variable:  Total Public Sector Employees 
as % of Population  
 
Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model GMM Approach 
Expenditure Decentralization 0.015 0.015 0.141 
 (0.18) 
 
(0.18) (2.22)* 
Unitary Country - 5.115 4.453 
 - 
 
(3.48)** (3.17)** 
Local Election 2.468 1.619 -0.430 
 (3.91)** 
 
(1.22) (0.30) 
OECD Country - -1.685 1.198 
 - 
 
(0.50) (0.53) 
GDP per capita 0.543 0.276 -0.001 
 (1.29) 
 
(1.34) (0.01) 
Openness 0.011 0.019 0.030 
 (0.41) 
 
(1.27) (1.83) 
Degree of Urbanization 0.267 0.007 0.088 
 (1.30) 
 
(0.16) (2.24)* 
Constant -16.878 0.146 -5.780 
 (1.10) 
 
(0.04) (1.86) 
Observations 108 108 108 
Number of countries 41 41  
R-squared 0.38   
Absolute value of robust t-statistics is given in parentheses. 
In each regression model we include a set of time dummies, but we do not report the coefficients on those 
dummies. 
* and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% level respectively. 
The estimated serial correlation coefficient for Fixed Effects and Random Effects models is 0.275. 
The instrumental variables used in the GMM are ethnic, language and religion fractionalization indices. 
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Table 9: Estimated Coefficients on Total Public Sector Employment 
 
Dependent Variable:  Total Public Sector Employees  
as % of Labor Force 
 
Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model GMM Approach 
Expenditure Decentralization -0.057 -0.037 0.236 
 (0.36) 
 
(0.22) (1.97)* 
Unitary Country 0.000 9.413 8.397 
 (.) 
 
(3.34)** (2.80)** 
Local Election 4.586 3.570 -0.749 
 (3.76)** 
 
(1.34) (0.27) 
OECD Country 0.000 -2.094 4.425 
 (.) 
 
(0.31) (1.00) 
GDP per capita 0.983 0.441 -0.180 
 (1.05) 
 
(1.07) (0.77) 
Openness 0.018 0.038 0.068 
 (0.34) 
 
(1.20) (2.18)* 
Degree of Urbanization 0.287 0.013 0.205 
 (0.75) 
 
(0.14) (2.80)** 
Constant -12.712 4.465 -9.704 
 (0.43) 
 
(0.55) (1.60) 
Observations 108 108 108 
 Number of Countries 
R-squared 
41 
0.38 
41 
 
Absolute value of robust t-statistics is given in parentheses. 
In each regression model we include a set of time dummies, but we do not report the coefficients on 
those dummies. 
* and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% level respectively. 
The estimated serial correlation coefficient for Fixed Effects and Random Effects models is 0.212. 
The instrumental variables used in the GMM are ethnic, language and religion fractionalization indices. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation seeks to investigate the relationship between public sector 
employment and fiscal decentralization. We develop a theoretical model that helps us 
understand the interaction of the central executive’s and subnational governor’s decisions 
on the level of public employees at the central and subnational levels. Our empirical work 
shows that fiscal decentralization policy shifts central government employees to the 
subnational government level and that the increase in public employees at the subnational 
government level overwhelms the decrease in public employees at the central level. As a 
result, the level of total public sector employees increases with the degree of fiscal 
decentralization of a country. We also find that the levels of total public sector employees 
as a percentage of population are higher in unitary country systems than those in federal 
countries.  The level of public employment also increases with the degree of urbanization 
and with the exposure to risk of a country. 
 In Chapter Two, we review the literature on this topic. First, we present three 
hypotheses that explain the variation of public sector employment across countries and 
over time. We also examine studies that relate to the determinants of public sector 
employment. However, we argue that most previous studies have ignored the structural 
change in public sector employment that may be generated by fiscal decentralization. 
Then, we review two different view points on the relationship between decentralization 
and public sector size, as measured by the ratio of public expenditure or revenue over 
GDP. From our literature review we find that despite the growing literature on fiscal 
decentralization issues, there has been so far little theoretical or empirical work done on
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the impact of fiscal decentralization on public sector employment. In addition, we also 
review two prior studies indicating the existence of spatial effects in the determination of 
fiscal policies on the expenditure of the budget. 
 In Chapter Three, we develop a two-player-two-period model that allows us to 
investigate the interaction between the central executive’s and the subnational governor’s 
decisions on the amount of public employees at both government levels. The theoretical 
model yields four hypotheses: first, higher degrees of fiscal decentralization are 
associated with higher levels of subnational government employment; second, total 
public sector employment is a function of the degree of fiscal decentralization but the 
direction is ambiguous, depending on two opposing effects; third, higher levels of GDP 
per capita are associated with higher levels of subnational government employment; 
finally, the level of subnational government employees is positively correlated with the 
ability of the subnational governors to shift the political cost caused from negative 
subnational budget gaps to the central executive. An important contribution of this 
dissertation is that we incorporate the production function of public goods into both the 
central executive’s and subnational governor’s utility function. Within this framework, 
we are able to investigate the interaction of decisions on the level of public employees at 
both the central and subnational governments. The level of total public sector employees 
can be further expressed as a function of the degree of fiscal decentralization, which our 
empirical study is based on. 
In Chapter Four, we conduct an empirical analysis to test the hypotheses drawn 
from our theoretical model. We use the SUR methodology and the World Bank Public 
Sector Employment & Wage Dataset for 38 OECD and non-OECD countries in either 
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1995 or 2000 or both periods to examine the determinant of central and subnational 
government employment and to investigate the change in subnational government 
employment relative to the change in central government employment. As a second stage 
of our empirical estimation, we use the fixed effects and random effects approaches and 
the International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset for 41 OECD and non-
OECD countries over the period from 1985 to 2005 to examine the determinants of the 
levels of total public sector employees as a percentage of population and labor force. 
While testing our hypotheses, we find evidence of heteroskedasticity on the residuals. 
Therefore, in our result tables, we report the robust standard error, which is valid under 
the condition of heteroskedasticity in an unknown form. We further employ the GMM 
method with three additional moment conditions in an attempt to improve the estimating 
efficiency. Our GMM estimators are also valid in the presence of any heteroskedasticity 
or serial correlation. 
 With fiscal decentralization policy, the central government transfers some 
expenditure responsibilities to the subnational governments, which drives the level of 
subnational government employees up. Our SUR estimation results confirm this 
hypothesis. We also find that the level of central government employees is higher in a 
unitary country than in a country with federalism constitution. This may be because in a 
unitary country the central government has direct authority over the subnational 
governments and control over most resource of the country, which allows the central 
executive to hire more public employees. Our empirical results also indicate that the level 
of subnational government employees is lower in a country whose subnational governor 
and legislature are elected locally than that in a country whose subnational governor and 
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legislature are appointed by the central government. This would be because locally 
elected governors take more direct responsibility for the negative subnational budget gap 
than governors appointed by the central government. 
 In terms of the level of total public sector employment, the empirical results of 
GMM approach show that it increases with the degree of fiscal decentralization. This is 
somewhat a surprising result. Typically, more public employment is associated with an 
excessive number of public sector employees, and, therefore, with unproductive spending. 
On the other hand, fiscal decentralization policy has been generally thought to result in an 
increase in allocative efficiency, since a decision on public expenditures made by a level 
of government that is closer and more responsive to a local constituency is more likely to 
reflect the demand for local services than a decision made by a remote central 
government. In addition, decentralization has been thought as having the potential of 
improving competition among governments and of facilitating technical innovations. 
Therefore, one might expect that fiscal decentralization should help to retrench the public 
sector employment. However, from our empirical result, we find that subnational 
governors without taking full responsibility for subnational public finance tends to bloat 
the levels of subnational government employees and ask the central government to pay 
the bill. As a result, the level of total public sector employees increases with fiscal 
decentralization policy. These findings are much in line with Oates’ (1972, 1985) and 
Wallis’64 anticipated results, but they are based on different explanations. 
Among the control variables, we find that the levels of total public sector 
employees as a percentage of population are higher in unitary countries than those in 
federal countries. Also, consistent with Kraay and van Rijckeghem’s (1995) study, we 
                                                 
64 Wallis’ argument has been cited in Oates (1985). 
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find that the level of public sector employees increases with the degree of urbanization. 
To capture the demographic character of our variable of interest, public 
employment, we also estimate the determinants of the level of public sector employees as 
a percentage of labor force. The results from this estimation are quite consistent with 
those found with the level of public sector employees as a percentage of population as the 
dependent variable. The only difference is that in this estimation the coefficient of the 
openness index is significantly positive at 5% level. This finding supports Rodrik’s (1997) 
argument that government jobs represent a partial insurance against external risks faced 
by the country. 
 Employing the two most commonly used spatial dependency tests, Moran’s I and 
Getis and Ord’s G statistics, we also find evidence of spatial dependency in terms of the 
level of public sector employees as a percentage of population among the countries in our 
dataset. Even though from the spatial dependency test, we are not able to see how the 
spatial effects affect the decision makers in making their policies. However, this finding 
suggests that while using country’s own domestic variables to explain the level of public 
sector employment, we should not ignore that the neighboring countries’ policies also 
play an important role in determining it.
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APPENDIX A: TOTAL PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEES 
Total Public Sector Employees (as % of Population) 
Year Group 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Albania ECA     8.58 6.96   
Argentina LAC       3.55   
Australia OECD 10.8 10.54 8.74 8.05 7.42 
Belgium OECD 9.13 9.62 10.08 10.23   
Bolivia LAC     2.81 2.63   
Brazil LAC   5.22 5.01 4.65   
Bulgaria ECA       15.24 9.66 
Canada OECD 11 11.23 10.27 9.24 9.14 
Chile LAC       3.33   
Colombia LAC       1.07   
Costa Rica LAC         5.3 
Croatia ECA       15.77 12.51 
Czech Republic ECA       10.82   
Denmark OECD       17.71   
Dominican Republic LAC     3.76 4.29   
Ethiopia AF         0.9 
Finland OECD 13.87 14.34 10.84 11.03   
France OECD       8.25   
Germany OECD     8.79     
Hungary ECA     7.92 9.26 8.5 
India AS 2.35 2.3 2.19 1.98   
Ireland OECD   7.73 7.88 7.6   
Italy OECD     6.44 6.18   
Lithuania ECA       14.76 12.68 
Malaysia AS 4.76 4.12 3.47 3.26   
Mexico LAC   5.85 5.22 4.95   
Netherlands OECD     9.63 9.81   
New Zealand OECD         5.97 
Norway OECD     18.52 19.02 18.87 
Panama LAC   5.93 5.77     
Poland ECA     14.45 11.94 9.35 
Romania ECA   34.31 24.54 17.78 10.52 
Slovak Republic ECA       13.39 10.72 
South Africa AF     4.42 4.13   
Spain OECD 4.71 5.44 5.68 5.91   
Sweden OECD 19.55 19.55 14.48 13.96   
Switzerland OECD 8.41   9.36 8.38 7.97 
Thailand AS 3.28 3.49 4.26 4.28 4.37 
United Kingdom OECD 11.06 10.05 9.25 8.88   
United States OECD 7.01 7.48 7.48 7.27   
Zimbabwe AF 3.8 3.43 2.76     
Source:  International Labor Organization Public Sector Dataset Website, http://laborsta.ilo.org/, 
accessed June 11, 2007. 
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APPENDIX B: CENTRAL AND SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 
Central and Subnational Government Employees (as % of Population) 
 1995 2000 
Country 
Central 
Government 
Employees 
Subnational 
Government 
Employees 
Central 
Government 
Employees 
Subnational 
Government 
Employees 
Albania 1.9 0.2 0.05 0.2 
Argentina 0.9 2.8   
Australia 1.3 2.3 0.8 2.08 
Belgium 1.7 2.3   
Bolivia 1.2 0.2   
Brazil 0.31 1.26   
Bulgaria 0.9 0.3 0.38 0.38 
Canada 1 1.8 1.09 2.06 
Chile 0.3 0.2 0.82 0.2 
Colombia   4.99 0.49 
Croatia 1.6 0.6 1.88 0.43 
Czech Republic   4.76 2.32 
Denmark 2.8 5.2 3.12 10.14 
Finland 2.2 7.7 2.4 8.07 
France 2.7 2.2 3.59 2.37 
Germany 0.4 2.6   
Hungary 1.4 1.3 1.46 1.56 
India 0.4 0.4 0.28 0.56 
Indonesia 0.7 0.3 0.74 0.23 
Ireland 1.2 0.8 5.27 0.71 
Italy 1.3 1.3 3.43 2.49 
Lithuania   1.26 0.49 
Malaysia 2.3 1.1   
Mexico 1.7 1.72 0.68 0.72 
Netherlands 3.9 1.3   
Norway 2.6 1.6   
Poland 0.2 0.4 0.42 0.29 
Portugal 1.8 0.8   
Romania   0.51 0.51 
Slovak Republic   0.46 0.33 
South Africa 1.4 1.1   
Spain 1.3 2 2.3 2.81 
Sweden 4.1 5.3   
Switzerland 2.1 2.5   
Thailand 1.2 0.9   
United Kingdom 1.3 2.2 3.06 3.37 
United States 1.2 3.2 0.97 5.9 
Zimbabwe 0.6 0.2   
Source:  Schiavo-Campo, Salvatore, Giulio de Tommaso and Amitabha Mukherjee, "An International 
Statistical Survey of Government Employment and Pay," World Bank Working Paper: 1771, and World 
Bank Public Sector Employment & Wage Dataset Website, http://sima-ext.worldbank.org/publicsector/, 
accessed June 11, 2007. 
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APPENDIX C: THE SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSION MODEL 
 
 In this appendix, we cover the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model as 
we have applied in the estimation of the System of Equations (14). 65 The SUR model can 
be viewed as a special case of the generalized regression model, and can be showed as: 
 2 ,1        ,...,1        ,' ,,, ==+⋅= jNiXy jijjiji εβ  
or, with the usual stacking of observation over i , 
 .2,1, =+⋅= jXy jjjj εβ
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where ⊗  is the Kronecker production notation. 
 The SUR model permits nonzero covariance between the error terms ijε  and ikε  
for a given individual i  across equations j  and k , i.e., ijkijiCov σεε =),( ,, , while 
assuming 0),( ',, =kijiCov εε , where 'i  represents any individual other than individual i . It 
is the potential nonzero covariance across equations j  and k  that allows for an 
improvement in efficiency of the generalized least squares (GLS) relative the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimator of each jβ . 
 Denoting the element in the ith row and jth column of 1−∑  by ijσ ,  i.e., 
][1 ijσ≡∑− .  Assuming ∑  is known, the GLS estimator of the vector β   is 
                                                 
65 For more detail discussion on this, please refer to Section 15.4 of Greene (2000). 
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The asymptotic covariance matrix for the GLS estimator is the inverse matrix in the 
above equation. 
 Zellner (1962) and Dwivedi and Srivastava (1978) have analyzed some special 
cases of this model.  First, if the equations are actually unrelated, that is, jiij ≠= for  0σ , 
then the GLS estimator is the OLS estimator.  Second, if the regressors of these equations 
are identical, that is, ji XX = , then GLSOLS ββ ˆˆ = .  However, the greater the correlation of 
the disturbances, the greater the efficiency gain accruing to GLS. 
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APPENDIX D: HOMOSKEDASTICITY TESTS 
 
 In this appendix, we introduce two popular tests for heteroskedasticity: the White 
test and the Breusch and Pagan test. The homoskedasticity assumption, ２)|( σ=XuVar i , 
can be replaced with the weaker assumption that the squared error, 2iu , is uncorrelated 
with all the independent variables, the squares of the independent variables, and all the 
cross products. This observation motivated White (1980) to propose a test for 
heteroskedasticity. The White test is carried out by obtaining 2Rn ⋅  in the regression of 
2ˆiu  on a constant and all the independent variables, the squares of the independent 
variables, and all the cross products. The statistics asymptotically form a chi-squared 
distribution with 1−k  degrees of freedom, where k  is the number of regressors in this 
regression, including the constant. 
 Breusch and Pagan (1979) have devised a Lagrange multiplier test of the 
hypothesis that )'( 0
22
ii zfu ⋅+⋅= αασ , where iz  is a vector of independent variables. The 
model is homoskedastic if 0=α . The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier statistic is 
given by: 
 )]
/ˆ'ˆ
ˆ
(')'()'
/ˆ'ˆ
ˆ
[(
2
1 212
nuu
uZZZZ
nuu
uLM ii −= . 
Under the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity, LM  is asymptotically distributed as 2χ  
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of variables in iz . 
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APPENDIX E: FIXED EFFECTS AND RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS 
 
 In this appendix, we introduce two common approaches that we employ in the 
estimation of Equation (15) to control the individual effect, ia , in the data.
66 The first 
approach is the fixed effects model. By fixed effects transforming the Equation (15), we 
obtain Equation (17): 
 tititi Xy ,,, εβ &&&&&& +⋅=                                                                                                   (17) 
where ititi yyy −≡ ,,&& , ititi XXX −≡ ,,&& , ititi εεε −≡ ,,&& , ∑
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1 εε . The time demeaning of the Equation (17) has removed the individual 
effect, ia . In absence of ia  in our Equation (17), we can estimate this equation by pooled 
OLS. Our fixed effects (FE) estimator, FEβˆ , is the pooled OLS estimator from the 
regression tiy ,&&  on tiX ,&& , which can be expressed as 
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The robust variance matrix estimator of FEβˆ  is 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
1
1 ''ˆˆ''ˆvarˆ −
=
− ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∑ XXXuuXXXA N
i
iiiiFE
&&&&&&&&&&&&β  
where FEiii Xyu βˆˆ &&&& −≡   denotes the fixed effects residuals. This robust variance matrix is 
suggested by Arellano (1987) and the robust standard errors are obtained as the square 
roots of the diagonal elements of this matrix, which are valid in the presence of any 
                                                 
66 For a thorough discussion of this topic please refer to Greene (2000), Wooldridge (2000, 2002). 
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heteroskedasticity or serial correlation. 
The second approach to estimate Equation (16) is to apply the random effects 
model. A random effects analysis puts the individual effect, ia , into the error term. The 
random effects model assumes that the individual effect is uncorrelated with each 
independent variable.  Since ia  is in the composite error in each time period, the tiu ,  are 
serial correlated across time.  Let )(Var ,
2
tiεσε = , )(Var2 ia a=σ . Under the random effect 
assumption, the serial correlation can be expressed as 
stuu aasiti ≠∀+= ),/(),Corr( 222,, εσσσ . 
Wooldridge (2002) derives the GLS transformation that eliminates serial 
correlation in the errors. The random effects transformation of Equation (15) can be 
showed as 
tititi Xy ,,, ~
~~ εβ +⋅=                                                                                                   (18) 
where ititi yyy λ−≡ ,,~ , ititi XXX λ−≡ ,,~ , ititi ελεε −≡ ,,~ , and 2/1222 )]/([1 aσσσλ εε +−= .  
The tilde again denotes the time averages. The random effects estimator, REβˆ , is the 
pooled OLS estimator from the regression tiy ,~  on tiX ,
~ , and can be expressed as 
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2ˆ εσ  and 2ˆaσ , are  consistent estimators of 2εσ  and 2aσ , which are based on the pooled OLS 
or fixed effects residuals. The robust variance matrix estimator of REβˆ  is given as  
( ) 1
1
1
1
11
1
1
1 ˆ'ˆ'ˆˆˆ'ˆ'ˆvarˆ
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ii
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i
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N
i
iiRE XXXvvXXXA β  
where FEiii Xyv βˆˆ −≡  is the random effects residuals. The robust standard errors are 
obtained in the same way from the robust variance matrix estimator as we have discussed 
in the case of the fixed effect approach. 
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APPENDIX F: THE TEST FOR INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS VERSUS POOLED OLS 
 
 Recall our estimation of Equation (15): 
 tiitititititi aWELEUNIDECPSE ,,4,3,2,10, εβββββ ++⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+=                  (15) 
where ia  are called an individual effect or individual heterogeneity. We rewrite Equation 
(15) as: 
 tititi uXy ,,, +⋅= β                                                                                                  (16) 
where tiy ,  is our dependent variable, public sector employees as a percentage of 
population of country i  at time t  and tiX ,  includes a constant term and all our dependent 
variables of country i  at time t . tiiti au ,, ε+≡  are the composite errors. Under the 
assumption that there is no correlation between tiX ,  and tiu , , the pooled OLS estimator 
can be used to obtain a consistent estimator of β  in estimation of Equation (16). Ignoring 
the individual effects, the pooled OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent if the 
individual effects are correlated with the dependent variables. 
Under the assumption of the individual effects being jointly equal to zero, the 
pooled OLS estimator is the best linear unbiased estimator. Breusch and Pagan (1979) 
have derived a statistic using the Lagrange multiplier in a likelihood setting to test the 
presence of individual effects. The null hypothesis of the absence of individual effects, 
statistically equivalent to 0: 20 =aH σ , is against the alternative hypothesis of the 
presence of individual effects, or 0: 21 ≠aH σ .  The test statistic is given by 
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where tie ,  is the OLS residuals. Under the null hypothesis, the LM statistic forms a chi-
squared distribution with one degree of freedom.67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 For detailed discussion of this section please refer to Greene (2000), Chapter 14. 
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APPENDIX G: THE HAUSMAN TEST 
 
The distinction between fixed and random effects models is the assumption 
whether or not the individual effects are correlated with the independent variables. 
Hausman (1978) test, based on the difference between the random effects and fixed 
effects estimates, can be used to test the correlation between the individual effects and the 
independent variables. Under the null hypothesis of no correlation, both fixed effects and 
random effects estimates are consistent, but fixed effects estimate is inefficient, whereas 
under the alternative hypothesis, the fixed effects estimate is consistent, but the random 
effects estimate is not. Under the null hypothesis, these two estimates should not differ 
systematically. The Hausman statistic can be computed as follows: 
 )ˆˆ()]ˆvar(Aˆ)ˆvar(Aˆ[)'ˆˆ( 1 REFEREFEREFEH ββββββ −−−= − . 
 Under the null hypothesis, the Hausman statistic is asymptotically distributed as 
chi-squared with 1−k  degrees of freedom, where k  is the number of regressors in this 
regression, including the constant. 
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APPENDIX H: THE GENERALIZED METHOD OF MOMENTS ESTIMATION 
 
 In this appendix, we introduce the third approach, the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimation, which we employed to estimate Equation (15). We have 
rewritten the Equation (15) as: 
 tititi uXy ,,, +⋅= β                                                                                                  (16) 
 The intuition of GMM is to use the moment conditions that are assumed to be 
satisfied to minimize the GMM objective function. Thus, we need the moment condition 
0)'( =uXE  in Equation (16) to be satisfied. In testing for the endogeneity of variable the 
degree of fiscal decentralization, we have a set of three additional exogenous variables. 
Let Z  be the set of our exogenous variables, including the independent variables in 
Equation (16) and three fractionalization index variables. Consequently, our moment 
condition can be rewritten as 0)'( =uZE . Our GMM method is to choose an estimator to 
minimize the objective function: 
 )()'()( βββ gWgnJ ⋅= , 
where uZ
n
g '1)( =β , W  is an LL×  weighting matrix and L  is the number of exogenous 
variables in Z . There are as many GMM estimators as there are choices of weighting 
matrix W . The efficient GMM estimator is the GMM estimator with an optimal 
weighting matrix. Let S  be the covariance matrix of the moment conditions, that is, 
)''(1 ZuuZE
n
S = .  The efficient GMM estimator, EGMMβˆ , is obtained by choosing 
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1−= SW  and can be expressed as:68 
 yZZSXXZZSXEGMM '')''(ˆ
111 −−−=β  
with asymptotic variance 
 11 )''1()ˆvar(ˆ −−= XZZSX
n
A EGMMβ . 
 Under the condition that there are no endogenous regressors in our regression 
model and we have additional moment conditions, our efficient GMM estimator is that of 
Cragg’s heteroskedasticity OLS. This estimator is more efficient than OLS in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form and the efficiency gains drive from the 
additional moment conditions (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1992) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 For more detail discussion on GMM, please refer to Greene (2000), Chapter 11 and Wooldridge (2002), 
Chapter 14. 
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APPENDIX I: SPATIAL DEPENDENCY TESTS 
 
Spatial dependence tests measure the extent of spatial autocorrelation among 
observations in a given geographic space. There are a number of tests that are used for 
this purpose, among which Moran’s I and Getis and Ord’s G statistics are most 
commonly used. We use these two approaches to test for spatial autocorrelation in this 
study.69 
The Moran’s I statistic is a weighted correlation coefficient used to detect 
departures from spatial randomness and is considered to be global in the sense that 
estimates the overall degree of spatial autocorrelation for our dataset. This statistic is 
given as: 
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where M is the spatial weight matrix, 
n
y
y
n
i
i∑
== 1  , n is the number of observations, and 0S  
is a standardization factor which is equal to all summation of all elements in the weight 
matrix. The expected value of Moran’s I is ( )1
1
−− n . The null hypothesis for the Moran’s 
I test is the absence of spatial dependence. The I statistic for our data exceeding its 
expected value indicates that there is positive spatial autocorrelation among the 
observations of our data. 
                                                 
69 For more detail about these two spatial dependency tests, please refer to Anselin (1988), Anselin and 
Florax (1995), and Getis and Ord (1992). 
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 The Getis and Ord’s G statistic is a multiplicative measure of overall spatial 
association of values which fall within a given distance of each other. The G statistic is 
given as: 
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The expected value of Getis and Ord’s G statistic is ( )11−
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= =
nn
M
n
ii
n
j . The G statistic for our data 
exceeding its expected value indicates a clustering. 
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